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When securing complex infrastructures or large environments, constant surveillance of 
every area is not affordable. To cope with this issue, a common countermeasure is the 
usage of cheap but wide-ranged sensors, able to detect suspicious events that occur in 
large areas, supporting patrollers to improve the effectiveness of their strategies. However, 
such sensors are commonly affected by uncertainty. In the present paper, we focus on 
spatially uncertain alarm signals. That is, the alarm system is able to detect an attack but 
it is uncertain on the exact position where the attack is taking place. This is common when 
the area to be secured is wide, such as in border patrolling and fair site surveillance. We 
propose, to the best of our knowledge, the ﬁrst Patrolling Security Game where a Defender
is supported by a spatially uncertain alarm system, which non-deterministically generates 
signals once a target is under attack. We show that ﬁnding the optimal strategy is FNP-hard 
even in tree graphs and APX-hard in arbitrary graphs. We provide two (exponential time) 
exact algorithms and two (polynomial time) approximation algorithms. Finally, we show 
that, without false positives and missed detections, the best patrolling strategy reduces to 
stay in a place, wait for a signal, and respond to it at best. This strategy is optimal even 
with non-negligible missed detection rates, which, unfortunately, affect every commercial 
alarm system. We evaluate our methods in simulation, assessing both quantitative and 
qualitative aspects.
© 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Security Games model the task of protecting physical environments as a non-cooperative game between a Defender and 
an Attacker [1]. These games usually take place under a Stackelberg (a.k.a. leader–follower) paradigm [2], where the Defender 
(leader) commits to a strategy and the Attacker (follower) ﬁrst observes such commitment and then best responds to it. 
As discussed in the seminal work [3], ﬁnding a leader–follower equilibrium is computationally tractable in games with 
one follower and complete information, while it becomes hard in Bayesian games with different types of Attacker. The 
availability of such computationally tractable aspects of Security Games led to the development of algorithms capable of 
scaling up to large problems, making them deployable in the security enforcing systems of several real-world applications. 
The ﬁrst notable examples are the deployment of police checkpoints at the Los Angels International Airport [4] and the 
scheduling of federal air marshals over the U.S. domestic airline ﬂights [5]. More recent case studies include the positioning 
of U.S. Coast Guard patrols to secure crowded places, bridges, and ferries [6] and the arrangement of city guards to stop 
fare evasion in Los Angeles Metro [7]. Finally, a similar approach is being tested and evaluated in Uganda, Africa, for the 
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on-the-ﬁeld effectiveness in a number of real security scenarios.
We focus on a speciﬁc class of security games, called Patrolling Security Games. These games are modeled as inﬁnite-
horizon extensive-form games in which the Defender controls one or more patrollers moving within an environment, 
represented as a ﬁnite graph. The Attacker, besides having knowledge of the strategy to which the Defender committed 
to, can observe the movements of the patrollers at any time and use such information in deciding the most convenient 
time and target location to attack [9]. When multiple patrollers are available, coordinating them at best is in general a hard 
task which, besides computational aspects, must also keep into account communication issues [10]. However, the patrolling 
problem is tractable, even with multiple patrollers, in border security (e.g., line and cycle graphs), when patrollers have 
homogeneous moving and sensing capabilities and all the vertices composing the border share the same features [11]. Scal-
ing this model involved the study of how to compute patrolling strategies in scenarios where the Attacker is allowed to 
perform multiple attacks [12]. Similarly, coordination strategies among multiple defenders are investigated in [13]. In [14], 
the authors study the case in which there is a temporal discount on the targets. Extensions are discussed in [15], where 
coordination strategies between defenders are explored, in [16], where a resource can cover multiple targets, and in [17]
where attacks can be detected at different stages with different associated utilities. Finally, some theoretical results about 
properties of speciﬁc patrolling settings are provided in [18]. In the present paper, we provide a new model of Patrolling 
Security Games in which the Defender is supported by an alarm system deployed in the environment.
1.1. Motivating scenarios
Often, in large environments, a constant surveillance of every area is not affordable while focused inspections triggered 
by alarms are more convenient. Real-world applications include UAVs surveillance of large infrastructures [19], wildﬁres 
detection with CCD cameras [20], agricultural ﬁelds monitoring [21], surveillance based on wireless sensor networks [22], 
and border patrolling [23]. Alarm systems are in practice affected by detection uncertainty, e.g., missed detections and false 
positives, and localization (a.k.a. spatial) uncertainty, e.g., the alarm system is uncertain about the exact target under attack. 
We summarily describe two practical security problems that can be ascribed to this category. We report them as examples, 
presenting features and requirements that our model can properly deal with. In the rest of the paper we will necessarily 
take a general stance, but we encourage the reader to keep in mind these two cases as reference applications for a real 
deployment of our model.
1.1.1. Fight to illegal poaching
Poaching is a widespread environmental crime that causes the endangerment of wildlife in several regions of the world. 
Its devastating impact makes the development of surveillance techniques to contrast this kind of activities one of the most 
important matters in national and international debates. Poaching typically takes place over vast and savage areas, making 
it costly and ineffective to solely rely on persistent patrol by ranger squads. To overcome this issue, recent developments 
have focused on providing rangers with environmental monitoring systems to better plan their inspections, concentrating 
them in areas with large likelihood of spotting a crime. Such systems include the use of UAVs ﬂying over the area, alarmed 
fences, and on-the-ﬁeld sensors trying to recognize anomalous activities.1 In all these cases, technologies are meant to 
work as an alarm system: once the illegal activity is recognized, a signal is sent to the rangers base station from where a 
response is undertaken. In the great majority of cases, a signal corresponds to a spatially uncertain localization of the illegal 
activity. For example, a camera-equipped UAV can spot the presence of a pickup in a forbidden area but cannot derive the 
actual location to which poachers are moving. In the same way, alarmed fences and sensors can only transmit the location 
of violated entrances or forbidden passages. In all these cases a signal implies a restricted, yet not precise, localization of 
the poaching activity. The use of Security Games in this particular domain is not new (see, for example, [8]). However, our 
model allows the computation of alarm response strategies for a given alarm system deployed on the ﬁeld. This can be 
done by adopting a discretization of the environment, where each target corresponds to a sector, values are related to the 
expected population of animals in that sector, and deadlines represent the expected completion time of illegal hunts (these 
parameters can be derived from data, as discussed in [8]).
1.1.2. Safety of fair sites
Fairs are large public events attended by thousands of visitors, where the problem of guaranteeing safety for the hosting 
facilities can be very hard. For example, Expo 2015, the recent Universal Exposition hosted in Milan, Italy, saw an average of 
about 100,000 visits per day. This poses the need for carefully addressing safety risks, which can also derive from planned 
act of vandalism or terrorist attacks. Besides security guards patrols, fair sites are often endowed with locally installed 
monitoring systems. Expo 2015 employed around 200 baﬄe gates and 400 metal detectors at the entrance of the site. The 
internal area was constantly monitored by 4000 surveillance cameras and by 700 guards. Likely, when one or more of these 
devices/personnel identiﬁed a security breach, a signal was sent to the control room together with a circumscribed request 
of intervention. This approach is required because, especially in this kind of environments, detecting a security breach 
1 See, for example, http :/ /wildlandsecurity.org/.
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equipment and personnel whose employment on a demand basis is much more convenient. Moreover, the detecting location 
of a threat is in many cases different from the location where it could be neutralized, making the request of intervention 
spatially uncertain. For instance, consider a security guard or a surveillance camera detecting the visitors’ reactions to a 
shooting rampage performed by some attacker. In examples like these, we can restrict the area where the security breach 
happened but no precise information about the location can be gathered since the attacker will probably have moved. Our 
model could be applied to provide a policy with which schedule interventions upon a security breach is detected in some 
particular section of the site. In such case, targets could correspond to buildings or other installations where visitors can 
go. Values and deadlines can be chosen according to the importance of targets, their expected crowding, and the required 
response priority.
1.2. Alarms and security games
While the problem of managing a sensor network to optimally guard security-critical infrastructures has been investi-
gated in restricted domains, e.g. [24], the problem of integrating alarm signals together with adversarial patrolling is almost 
completely unexplored. The only work that can be classiﬁed under this scope is [25]. The paper proposes a skeleton model 
of an alarm system where sensors have no spatial uncertainty in detecting attacks on single targets. The authors analyse 
how sensory information can improve the effectiveness of patrolling strategies in adversarial settings. They show that, when 
sensors are not affected by false negatives and false positives, the best strategy prescribes that the patroller just responds 
to an alarm signal rushing to the target under attack without patrolling the environment. As a consequence, in such cases 
the model treatment becomes trivial. On the other hand, when sensors are affected only by false negatives, the treatment 
can be carried out by means of an easy variation of the algorithm for the case without sensors [9]. In the last case, where 
false positives are admitted, the problem becomes computationally intractable. To the best of our knowledge, no previous 
result dealing with spatial uncertain alarm signals in adversarial patrolling is present in the literature.
Effectively exploiting an alarm system and determining a good deployment for it (e.g., selecting the location where to 
install sensors) are complementary but radically different problems. The results we provide in this work lie in the scope of 
the ﬁrst one while the treatment of the second one is left for future works. In other words, we assume that a deployed 
alarm system is given and we deal with the problem of strategically exploiting it at best. Any approach to search for the 
optimal deployment should know, in principle, how to evaluate possible deployments. In such sense, our problem needs to 
be addressed before one might deal with the deployment one.
1.3. Contributions
In this paper, we propose the ﬁrst Security Game that integrates a spatially uncertain alarm system in game-theoretic 
settings for patrolling.2 An alarm signal carries the information about the set of targets that can be under attack and it is 
described by the probability of being generated when each target is attacked. The analysis and the main results we propose 
in this work are devoted to the basic game model where the Defender can control a single patroller and the alarm system 
is immune to false positives and false negatives, making spatial uncertainty its only limitation. As our results show, such 
assumptions do not play down the signiﬁcance of the arising computational challenges whose resolution is a prerequisite 
for more complex settings. Indeed, extensions of this model that generalize to multi-resource settings [27] and that consider 
false negatives [28] are built on the basic result provided in this work. The game we consider can be decomposed in a ﬁnite 
number of ﬁnite-horizon subgames, each called Signal Response Game from v (SRG-v) and capturing the situation in which 
the Defender is in a vertex v and the Attacker attacked a target, and an inﬁnite-horizon game, called Patrolling Game (PG), 
in which the Defender moves in absence of any alarm signal. We show that SRG-v is FNP-hard for tree-based topologies 
and that, for arbitrary graphs, is APX-hard. We provide two exact algorithms. The ﬁrst one, based on dynamic programming, 
performs a breadth-ﬁrst search, while the second one, based on branch-and-bound approach, performs a depth-ﬁrst search. 
We use the same two approaches to design two approximation algorithms.
Then, we study the PG, showing that when no false positives and no missed detections are present, the optimal Defender 
strategy is to stay in a ﬁxed location, wait for a signal, and respond to it at best. This strategy keeps being optimal even 
when non-negligible missed detection rates are allowed. We experimentally evaluate the scalability of our exact algorithms 
and we compare them with the approximation ones in terms of solution quality and compute times, investigating in hard 
instances the gap between our hardness results and the theoretical guarantees of our approximation algorithms. We show 
that our approximation algorithms provide very high quality solutions even in hard instances. Finally, we provide an example 
of resolution for a realistic instance, based on Expo 2015, and we show that our exact algorithms can be applied for such 
kind of settings. Moreover, in our realistic instance we assess how the optimal patrolling strategy coincides with a static 
placement even when allowing a false negative rate of less or equal to 30%.
2 A preliminary short version of this work is available in [26].
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1.4. Paper structure
In Section 2, we introduce our game model. In Section 3, we study the problem of ﬁnding the strategy of the Defender 
for responding to an alarm signal. In Section 4, we study the patrolling problem. In Section 5, we experimentally evaluate 
our algorithms. In Section 6, we brieﬂy discuss the main Security Games research directions that have been explored in 
the last decades. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper. Appendix A includes the most technical proofs of the paper while 
Appendix B discusses some particular results obtained for special classes of instances. Appendix C reports some additional 
experimental results and Appendix D provides a table summarizing the notation symbols used in the paper.
2. Problem statement
In this section we formalize the problem we study. More precisely, in Section 2.1 we describe the patrolling setting and 
the game model, while in Section 2.2 we state the computational questions we shall address in this work.
2.1. Game model
Initially, in Section 2.1.1, we introduce a basic patrolling security game model integrating the main features from models 
currently studied in literature. Next, in Section 2.1.2, we extend our game model by introducing alarm signals. In Sec-
tion 2.1.3, we depict the game tree of our patrolling security game with alarm signals and we decompose it in notable 
subgames to facilitate its study. To ease presentation, we summarized our notation symbols in Table D.3.
2.1.1. Basic patrolling security game
As is customary in the Artiﬁcial Intelligence literature [9,14], we deal with discrete, both in terms of space and time, 
patrolling settings, representing an approximation of a continuous environment. Speciﬁcally, we model the environment to 
be patrolled as an undirected connected graph G = (V , E), where vertices represent different areas connected by various 
corridors/roads represented through the edges. Time is discretized in turns. Edges are assigned weights representing the 
number of time steps needed to traverse them. If not stated otherwise, we shall assume unitary weights. With ω∗i, j we shall 
denote the shortest time to go from i to j. We deﬁne T ⊆ V the subset of sensible vertices, called targets, that must be 
protected from possible attacks. Each target t ∈ T is characterized by a value π(t) ∈ (0, 1] and a penetration time d(t) ∈N+ , 
which measures the number of turns needed to complete an attack to t .
Example 1. We report in Fig. 1 an example of patrolling setting. Here, V = {v0, v1, v2, v3, v4}, T = {t1, t2, t3, t4} where 
ti = vi for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. All the targets t present the same value π(t) and the same penetration time d(t).
At each turn, an Attacker A and a Defender D play simultaneously having the following available actions:
• if A has not attacked in the previous turns, it can observe the position of D in the graph G3 and decide whether to 
attack a target or to wait for a turn. The attack is instantaneous, meaning that there is no delay between the decision 
to attack and the actual presence of a threat in the selected target4;
• D has no information about the actions undertaken by A in previous turns and selects the next vertex to patrol among 
those adjacent to the current one; each movement is a non-preemptive traversal of a single edge (v, v ′) ∈ E .
The game may conclude in correspondence of any of the two following events. The ﬁrst one is when D patrols a target 
t that is under attack by A from less than d(t) turns. In such case the attack is prevented and A is captured. The second 
3 Partial observability of A over the position of D can be introduced, as discussed in [29].
4 This is a worst-case assumption according to which A is as strong as possible. It can be relaxed by associating execution costs to the A’s actions, as 
shown in [30].
224 N. Basilico et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 246 (2017) 220–257Fig. 2. Examples of alarm systems.
one is when target t is attacked and D does not patrol t during the d(t) turns that follow the beginning of the attack. In 
such case, the attack is successful and A escapes without being captured. When A is captured, D receives a utility of 1
and A receives a utility of 0. When an attack to t has success, D receives 1 − π(t) and A receives π(t). The game may 
not conclude if A decides to wait for every observed position of D, thus never attacking. In such case, D receives 1 and A
receives 0. (Another intuitive way to think at this payoff structure is to assume that D receives an initial utility of 1 and 
then loses π(t) whenever target t is successfully compromised.) Notice that the game is constant sum and therefore it is 
equivalent to a zero-sum game through a positive aﬃne transformation.
The above game model is in extensive form (being played sequentially), with imperfect information (D not observing 
the actions undertaken by A), and with inﬁnite horizon (A being in the position to wait forever). The fact that A can 
observe the actions undertaken by D before acting makes the leader–follower equilibrium the natural solution concept for 
our problem, where D is the leader and A is the follower. Since we focus on zero-sum games, the leader’s strategy at the 
leader–follower equilibrium is its maxmin strategy and it can be found by employing linear mathematical programming, 
which requires polynomial time in the number of actions available to the players [31].
2.1.2. Introducing alarm signals
We extend the game model described in the previous section by introducing a spatial uncertain alarm system that can be 
exploited by D. The basic idea is that an alarm system uses a number of sensors spread over the environment to gather 
information about possible attacks and raises an alarm signal at any time an attack occurs. The alarm signal provides some 
information about the location (target) where the attack is ongoing, but it is affected by uncertainty. In other words, the 
alarm system detects an attack but it is uncertain about the target under attack. Formally, the alarm system is deﬁned as a 
pair (S, p), where S = {s1, · · · , sm} is a set of m ≥ 1 signals and p : S × T → [0, 1] is a function that speciﬁes the probability 
of having the system generating a signal s given that target t has been attacked, we denote such probability with p(s | t). 
With a slight abuse of notation, for a signal s we deﬁne T (s) = {t ∈ T | p(s | t) > 0} and, similarly, for a target t we have 
S(t) = {s ∈ S | p(s | t) > 0}. In this work, we assume that:
• the alarm system is not affected by false positives (signals generated when no attack has occurred). Formally, p(s | ) =
0, where  indicates that no targets are under attack;
• the alarm system is not affected by false negatives (signals not generated even though an attack has occurred). Formally, 
p(⊥ | t) = 0, where ⊥ indicates that no signals have been generated; in Section 4 we will show that the optimal 
strategies we compute under this assumption can preserve optimality even in presence of non-negligible false negatives 
rates.
Example 2. We report two examples of alarm systems for the patrolling setting depicted in Fig. 1. The ﬁrst example is 
reported in Fig. 2(a). It is a low-accuracy alarm system that generates the same signal anytime a target is under attack and 
therefore that does not provide any information about the target under attack. The second example is reported in Fig. 2(b). 
It provides more accurate information about the localization of the attack than the previous example. Here, the reception of 
a signal si implies, under a uniform strategy of A, a high probability of an attack on target ti . Namely, when ti is attacked 
the alarm system generates si with high probability and a different signal otherwise. 
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turn, before deciding its next move, D observes whether or not a signal has been generated by the alarm system and 
then makes its decision considering such information. This introduces in our game a node of chance implementing the 
non-deterministic selection of signals.
2.1.3. The game tree and its decomposition
Here we depict the game tree of our game model, decomposing it in some recurrent subgames. A portion of the game 
is depicted in Fig. 3. Such tree can be read along the following steps.
• Root of the tree. A decides whether to wait for a turn (this action is denoted as  to indicate that no target is attacked) 
or to attack a target t ∈ T (this action is denoted by the label t of the attacked target).
• Second level of the tree. N denotes the alarm system, represented by a nature-type player. Its behavior is a priori speciﬁed 
by the conditional probability mass function p, which determines the generated signal given the attack performed by 
A. In particular, it is useful to distinguish between two cases:
(a) if A does not attack (action ), then no signal will be generated under the assumption that p(⊥ | ) = 1;
(b) if A attacks target t , a signal s will be drawn from S(t) with probability p(s | t) (recall that p(⊥ | t) = 0).
• Third level of the tree. D observes the signal generated by the alarm system and decides the next vertex to patrol among 
those adjacent to the current one (the current vertex is initially chosen by D).
• Fourth level of the tree and on. It is useful to distinguish between two cases:
(a) if no attack is present, then the tree of the subgame starting from here is the same of the tree of the whole game, 
except for the position of D that may be different from the initial one (notice that in this case each of A’s decision 
nodes is a singleton information set, modeling the fact that A can observe D’s position);
(b) if an attack is taking place on target t , then only D can act.
Such game tree can be decomposed in a number of ﬁnite recurrent subgames such that the best strategies of the agents 
in each subgame are independent from those in other subgames. This decomposition allows us to apply a divide et impera
approach, simplifying the resolution of the problem of ﬁnding an equilibrium. More precisely, we denote with  one of these 
subgames. We deﬁne  as a game subtree that can be extracted from the tree of Fig. 3 as follows. Given D’s current vertex 
v ∈ V , select a decision node for A and call it i. Then, extract the subtree rooted in i discarding the branch corresponding to 
action  (no attack).5 Intuitively, such subgame models the players’ interaction when the Defender is in some given vertex 
v and the Attacker will perform an attack. As a consequence, each  obtained in such way is ﬁnite (once an attack on t
started, the maximum length of the game is d(t)). Moreover, the set of different s we can extract is ﬁnite since we have one 
subgame for each possible current vertex for D. As a consequence, we can extract at most |V | different subgames. Notice 
that, due to the inﬁnite horizon, each subgame can recur an inﬁnite number of times along the game tree. However, being 
such repetitions independent and the game zero-sum, we only need to solve one subgame to obtain the optimal strategy to 
be applied in each of its repetitions. In other words, when assuming that an attack will be performed, the agents’ strategies 
can be split in a number of independent strategies solely depending on the current position of D. The reason why we 
discarded the branch corresponding to action  in each subgame is that we seek to deal with such complementary case 
exploiting a simple backward induction approach, as explained later.
First, we call Signal Response Game from v the subgame  deﬁned as above and characterized by a vertex v representing 
the current vertex of D (for brevity, we shall use SRG-v). In an SRG-v , the goal of D is to ﬁnd the best strategy starting from 
vertex v to respond to any alarm signal. All the SRG-vs are independent and thus the best strategy in each subgame does 
not depend on the strategies of the other subgames. The intuition is that the best strategy in an SRG-v does not depend on 
the vertices visited by D before the attack. Given an SRG-v , we denote by σDv,s the strategy of D once observed signal s, 
by σDv the strategy proﬁle σDv = (σDv,s1 . . . , σDv,sm ) of D, and by σAv the strategy of A. Let us notice that in an SRG-v , given 
a signal s, D is the only agent that plays and therefore each sequence of moves can be collapsed in a single action. Thus, 
SRG-v is essentially a two-level game in which A decides the target to attack and D decides the sequence of moves on the 
graph.
Then, according to classical backward induction arguments [32], once we have found the best strategies of each SRG-v , 
we can substitute the subgames with the agents’ equilibrium utilities and then we can ﬁnd the best strategy of D for 
patrolling the vertices whenever no alarm signal has been raised and the best strategy of attack for A. We call this last 
problem Patrolling Game (for conciseness, we shall use PG). We denote by σD and σA the strategies of D and A, respec-
tively, in the PG.
5 Rigorously speaking, our deﬁnition of subgame is not compliant with the deﬁnition provided in Game Theory [32], which requires that all the actions 
of a node belong to the same subgame (and therefore we could not separate action  from actions t). However, we can slightly change the structure of 
our game making our deﬁnition of subgame compliant with the one from game theory. More precisely, it is suﬃcient to split each node of A into two 
nodes: in the ﬁrst A decides to attack a target or to wait for one turn, and in the second, conditioned to the fact that A decided to attack, A decides 
which target to attack. This way, the subtree whose root is the second node of A is a subgame compliant with game theory. It can be easily observed that 










ed lines indicate information sets, and function UA(ri , t j)Fig. 3. Game tree, v is assumed to the be current vertex for D, r is a collapsed sequence of moves, called route, that D performs on the graph, dash
returns A’s payoff when A attacks target t j and D patrols on route ri .
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Our contributions focus on the design of algorithms to ﬁnd an equilibrium for our game and develop along four central 
questions. The ﬁrst one stems directly from our problem deﬁnition.
Question 1. Which is the best patrolling strategy for D maximizing its expected utility?
Clearly, this problem is related to what we called PG in our game decomposition. In order to build an answer, we pose 
other three questions that, instead, involve the other subgame called SRG-v .
Question 2. Given a starting vertex v and a signal s, is there any strategy allowing D to visit all the targets in T (s), each within its 
deadline?
Question 3. Given a starting vertex v and a signal s, is there any pure strategy giving D an expected utility of at least k?
Question 4. Given a starting vertex v and a signal s, is there any mixed strategy giving D an expected utility of at least k?
These questions are not independent from each other. In particular, answering to the last three is a prerequisite to 
solving the ﬁrst one. For this reason, we shall take a bottom-up approach answering the above questions starting from 
the last three and then dealing with the ﬁrst one at the whole-game level. Also, Questions 3 and 4 are not easier than 
Question 2 so hardness results for this last one can be extended to the others.
3. Signal response game
In this section we start by dealing with the resolution of SRG-v . Speciﬁcally, in Section 3.1 we prove the hardness of the 
problem, analyzing its computational complexity. Then, in Section 3.2 and in Section 3.3 we propose two algorithms, the 
ﬁrst based on dynamic programming (breadth-ﬁrst search) while the second adopts a branch and bound (depth-ﬁrst search) 
paradigm. Furthermore, we provide a variation for each algorithm, approximating the optimal solution. For the sake of 
presentation, the most technical proofs are reported in Appendix A.
3.1. Complexity results
The aim of this section is to assess the computational complexity of ﬁnding an exact or approximate equilibrium for our 
game model. Furthermore, we aim at identifying the source of hardness of our problem and the most eﬃcient algorithm for 
solving it.
Each SRG-v is characterized by |T | actions available to A, each corresponding to a target t , and by O (|V |maxt {d(t)})
decision nodes of D. The portion of game tree played by D can be safely reduced by observing that D will move between 
any two targets along a shortest path. This allows us to discard from the tree all the decision nodes where D occupies 
a non-target vertex. Nevertheless, this reduction keeps the size of the game tree exponential in the parameters of the 
game, speciﬁcally O (|T ||T |).6 Notice that, the exponential size of the game tree does not constitute a proof that ﬁnding the 
equilibrium strategies of an SRG-v requires exponential time in the parameters of the game because it does not exclude the 
existence of some compact representation of D’s strategies, e.g., Markovian strategies. The ﬁrst result we provide implies 
that such a representation is very unlikely to exist or that, if it exists, it unlikely can be computed in polynomial time. Call 
gv the expected utility of A from SRG-v (1 − gv is then the corresponding utility for D). We deﬁne the following problem.
Deﬁnition 1 (k–SRG-v). The decision problem k–SRG-v is deﬁned as:
INSTANCE: an instance of SRG-v;
QUESTION: is there any σD such that, when A plays its best response, it holds that gv ≤ k?
Theorem 1. k–SRG-v is NP-hard even when |S| = 1 and the graph is a tree.7
The above result shows that w.r.t. tree graphs:
• answering to Question 1 is FNP-hard,
• answering to Questions 2, 3, 4 is NP-hard.
6 A more accurate bound is O (|T |min{|T |,maxt {d(t)}}).
7 Rigorously speaking, we show NP-hardness for a more speciﬁc class of trees we call S2L–STARS. Details can be found in A.1.
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actions available to the min player A) always exists [33].
Now, given that we established that the main source of hardness of the problem is computing the strategy space of D, 
we focus on the problem of ﬁnding an eﬃcient representation for it. We start with some deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 2 (Route). Given a starting vertex v and a signal s, a route r is a ﬁnite sequence of vertices where, called r(i) the 
i-th vertex, r(0) = v and r(i) ∈ T (s) for any i > 0. With a slight overload of notation, call T (r) the set of targets from the 
sequence.
We restrict our attention to a special class of routes that we call covering. For a route r and i > 0, deﬁne Ar(r(i)) =∑i−1
h=0 ω∗r(h),r(h+1) . Such value gives the time needed by D to arrive at target r(i) after following a graph walk along the 
shortest paths between consecutive vertices of the sequence r(0), r(1), . . . , r(i).
Deﬁnition 3 (Covering route). A covering route is a route r where Ar(t) ≤ d(t) for any t ∈ T (r).
Covering routes are abstractions for D’s available pure strategies when the current vertex is v and a signal s has been 
generated. If r is a covering route for vertex v and signal s and T (r) ⊆ T (s) is the set of targets in r, then we can always 
instantiate r to a graph walk for D (a sequence of moves on G) that guarantees to capture A on any target in T (r). Such 
walk is simply obtained by starting from r(0) = v and then covering any shortest path between r(i) and r(i + 1). The total 
temporal cost of such walk is expressed by c(r) = Ar(r(|T (r)|)). We shall informally refer to such process as walking a route r.
Covering routes then constitute the action space for D is a SRG-v game. Even when considering a single signal s, the 
number such of such routes is O (|T (s)||T (s)|) in the worst case. However, some covering routes will never be played by D
due to any of the following two dominance arguments [34] and discarding dominated routes is crucial in the design of an 
eﬃcient algorithm.
Deﬁnition 4 (Intra-set dominance). Given a starting vertex v , a signal s and two different covering routes r, r′ such that 
T (r) = T (r′), if c(r) ≤ c(r′) then r dominates r′ .
Deﬁnition 5 (Inter-set dominance). Given a starting vertex v , a signal s and two different covering routes r, r′ , if T (r) ⊃ T (r′)
then r dominates r′ .
Furthermore, it is convenient to introduce the concept of covering set, which is strictly related to the concept of covering 
route. It is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 6 (Covering set). Given a starting vertex v and a signal s, a covering set (covset) Q is a subset of T (s) such that 
there exists a covering route r with T (r) = Q .
Let us focus on Deﬁnition 4. It suggests that we can safely use only one route per covering set. Covering sets suﬃce 
for describing all the outcomes of the game, since the agents’ payoffs depend only on the fact that A attacks a target t
that is covered by D or not, and in the worst case are O (2|T (s)|), with a remarkable reduction of the search space w.r.t. 
O (|T (s)||T (s)|). However, any algorithm restricting on covering sets should be able to determine whether or not a set of 
targets is a covering one, which is a diﬃcult problem as well.
Deﬁnition 7 (COV-SET). The decision problem COV-SET is deﬁned as:
INSTANCE: an instance of SRG-v with a target set T ;
QUESTION: is T a covering set? (Equivalently, does T admit any covering route r?)
Theorem 2. COV-SET is NP-complete.
Therefore, computing a covering route for a given set of targets (or deciding that no covering route exists) is not doable 
in polynomial time unless P = NP. This shows that, while covering sets suﬃce for deﬁning the payoffs of the game and 
therefore the size of the payoffs matrix can be bounded by the number of covering sets, in practice we also need covering 
routes to certify that a given subset of targets is covering. The impossibility to conﬁne our algorithms to the space of 
covering sets seems to suggest a complexity worse than O (2|T (s)|). However, in the next section we provide an algorithm 
with complexity O (2|T (s)|) (neglecting polynomial terms) to enumerate all and only the covering sets and, for each of them, 
the associated covering route with minimum cost.
Let us focus on Deﬁnition 5. Inter-Set dominance can be leveraged to introduce the concept of maximal covering sets 
(and routes) which could enable a further reduction in the set of actions available to D.
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covering route r′ such that Q ⊂ T (r′).
In the best case, when there is a route covering all the targets, the number of maximal covering sets is 1 (and we 
can safely restrict to a single minimum cost covering route over that set), while the number of covering sets (including 
the non-maximal ones) is 2|T (s)| . Thus, considering only maximal covering sets allows an exponential reduction of the 
payoffs matrix. In the worst case, when all the possible subsets composed of |T (s)|/2 targets are maximal covering sets, 
the number of maximal covering sets is O (2|T (s)|−2), while the number of covering sets is O (2|T (s)|−1), allowing a reduction 
of the payoffs matrix by a factor of 2. Furthermore, if we knew a priori that Q is a maximal covering set, we could avoid 
searching for covering routes for any set of targets that strictly contains Q . When designing an algorithm to solve this 
problem, Deﬁnition 5 could then be exploited to introduce pruning techniques to save average compute time. However, the 
following result shows that deciding if a covering set is maximal is hard.
Deﬁnition 9 (MAX–COV-SET). The decision problem MAX–COV-SET is deﬁned as:
INSTANCE: an instance of SRG-v with a target set T and a covering set T ′ ⊂ T ;
QUESTION: is T ′ maximal?
Theorem 3. There is no polynomial-time algorithm for MAX–COV-SET unless P = NP.
Nevertheless, we show hereafter that there exists an algorithm computing all and only the maximal covering sets and 
one route for each of them (which potentially leads to an exponential reduction of the time needed for solving the linear 
program) with only an additional polynomial cost w.r.t. the enumeration of all the covering sets. Therefore, neglecting 
polynomial terms, our algorithm has a complexity of O (2|T (s)|).
Finally, we focus on the complexity of approximating the best solution in an SRG-v . When D restricts its strategies to 
be pure, the problem is clearly not approximable in polynomial time even when the approximation ratio depends on |T (s)|. 
The basic intuition is that, if a game instance admits the maximal covering route that covers all the targets and the value 
of all the targets is 1, then either the maximal covering route is played returning a utility of 1 to D or any other route 
is played returning a utility of 0, but no polynomial-time algorithm can ﬁnd the maximal covering route covering all the 
targets, unless P = NP. On the other hand, it is interesting to investigate the case in which no restriction to pure strategies 
is present. We show that the problem keeps being hard.
Theorem 4. The optimization version of k–SRG-v, say OPT–SRG-v, is APX-hard even in the restricted case in which the graph is metric, 
there is only one signal s, all targets t ∈ T (s) have the same penetration time d(t), and there exists a maximal covering route covering 
all the targets.
The above theorem allows us to make two important remarks.
Remark 1. The above result does not exclude the existence of constant-ratio approximation algorithms for OPT–SRG-v . 
We conjecture that it is unlikely. OPT–SRG-v presents similarities with the (metric) DEADLINE–TSP, where the goal is to 
ﬁnd the longest path of vertices each traversed before its deadline. The DEADLINE–TSP does not admit any constant-ratio 
approximation algorithm [35] and the best-known approximation algorithm has logarithmic approximation ratio [36]. The 
following observations can be produced about the relationships between OPT–SRG-v and DEADLINE–TSP:
• when the maximal route covering all the targets in the OPT–SRG-v exists, the optimal solution of the OPT–SRG-v is 
also optimal for the DEADLINE–TSP applied to the same graph;
• when the maximal route covering all the targets in the OPT–SRG-v does not exist, the optimal solutions of the two 
problems are different, even when we restrict us to pure-strategy solutions for the OPT–SRG-v;
• approximating the optimal solution of the DEADLINE–TSP does not give a direct technique to approximate OPT–SRG-v , 
since we should enumerate all the subsets of targets and for each subset of targets we would need to execute the 
approximation of the DEADLINE–TSP, but this would require exponential time. We notice in addition that even the 
total number of sets of targets with logarithmic size is not polynomial, being (2log
2(|T |)), and therefore any algorithm 
enumerating them would require exponential time;
• when the optimal solution of the OPT–SRG-v is randomized, examples of optimal solutions in which maximal covering 
routes are not played can be produced, showing that at the optimum it is not strictly necessary to play maximal 
covering routes, but even approximations suﬃce.
Remark 2. If it were possible to map DEADLINE–TSP instances to OPT–SRG-v instances where the maximal covering route 
covering all the targets exists, then it would trivially follow that OPT–SRG-v does not admit any constant-approximation 
ratio. We were not able to ﬁnd such a mapping and we conjecture that, if there is an approximation-preserving reduction 
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mixed strategies may be optimal make the treatment very challenging.
3.2. Dynamic-programming algorithm
We start by presenting two algorithms. The ﬁrst one is exact, while the second one is an approximation algorithm. Both 
algorithms are based on a dynamic programming approach.
3.2.1. Exact algorithm
In this section we provide an algorithm to compute the strategies available to D when v is the current vertex and signal 
s has been generated by the alarm system. The idea is to adopt a dynamic programming method that enumerates covering 
sets of increasing cardinalities. Each covering set is obtained by a sequence of expansions that, starting from the empty set, 
add one target at each iteration. We denote a covering set by Q kv,t where k indicates its cardinality while v and t denote 
the starting vertex of D and the last target added to the set, respectively. The algorithm operates in such a way that the 
sequence of targets corresponding to the expansions made to obtain Q kv,t is a covering route for that set. Informally, we 
shall call it the generative route of Q kv,t and we will denote with c(Q
k
v,t) its temporal cost. We choose to obtain this by 
requiring any expansion to be admissible with respect to three conditions. Given a set Q kv,t a new set Q
k+1
v,w = Q kv,t ∪ {w}
can be obtained if:
1. w is not covered in the current covering set, that is w ∈ T (s) \ Q kv,t ;
2. w can be covered by d(w) by extending the generative route of Q kv,t with a shortest walk from t to w , that is d(w) ≥
c(Q kv,t) + ω∗t,w ;
3. call t′ a target visited by a shortest path from t to w , if t′ /∈ Q kv,t then it cannot be covered, that is d(t′) < c(Q kv,t) +ω∗t,t′ .
Conditions 1 and 2 require any expansion to form a new covering set consistent with Deﬁnition 6, thus ensuring the 
algorithm’s soundness. Condition 3 requires Q kv,t to be a proper descriptor of its generative route, meaning that such route, 
once walked, covers uniquely the targets included in Q kv,t and not targets outside it. This last requirement is an operational 
choice to reduce the number of expansions made in each iteration of the algorithm. Consider for instance a graph with 
degree bounded by 3, Condition 3 allows us to generate in the worst case 3 new covering sets at each expansion round 
instead of |T |. Notice that under Condition 3 the algorithm can still generate any maximal covering set.
Lemma 5. Any maximal covering set can be generated from the empty set with a sequence of admissible expansions.
Proof sketch. Consider an expansion which, by adding a target w , violates Condition 3 for a target t′ . Such expansion can 
always be split in two admissible ones. The ﬁrst adding t′ , the second adding w . The same rationale works for multiple 
expansions and multiple t′ and clearly applies to maximal covering sets which are a subset of covering sets. 
Condition 3 can be exploited to reduce the required compute time but, rigorously speaking, it presents a drawback. To 
establish if target w can be added to set Q kv,t the algorithm needs to check every shortest path from t to w , and such 
paths can be, in the worst case, exponentially many. We can cope with this by adopting the following simpliﬁcation. We 
ﬁx a set of canonical shortest paths by running the Floyd–Warshall algorithm. Then, given t and w , we fetch the canonical 
shortest path between them and we check Condition 3 assuming that such path is unique. If the condition is not veriﬁed 
under this assumption then it is also not veriﬁed in its original deﬁnition. If otherwise, the condition is veriﬁed, then the 
algorithm (assuming validity of Conditions 1 and 2) might obtain a covering set Q¯ k+1v,w which is not a proper one, meaning 
that by walking its generative route at least one target t′ /∈ Q¯ k+1v,w gets covered. Let us assume that this is the case and, 
w.l.o.g., that t′ is the only invalidating target. The algorithm’s current solution representation (the set Q¯ k+1v,w ) would then 
be inconsistent with the actual solution (the generative route). By Lemma 5 though, we know that the algorithm would 
generate also set Q k+2v,w making two admissible expansions with t′ and w to Q kv,t . Since Q k+2v,w = Q¯ k+1v,w ∪ {t′} the non-proper 
covering set Q¯ k+1v,w is removable by inter-set dominance (Deﬁnition 5). Obviously this workaround comes at an additional 
cost: the algorithm unnecessarily generates the set Q¯ k+1v,w which under the proper deﬁnition of Condition 3 would have been 
avoided. Still, the above solution turned out very convenient since exponential multiplicity of shortest paths is very unlikely 
in graphs representing real environments.
In Algorithm 1 we provide full technical details. Covering sets obtained by the algorithm are grouped in collections: 
Ckv,t denotes the collection of all covering sets of cardinality k where the last expansion added target t . After the required 
initialization steps (Lines 1 and 2) for any generated Q k−1v,t we compute the set of admissible expansions Q + (Line 6) and we 
apply each one of them (Line 8). In Step 9, we make use of a procedure called Search(Q , C) where Q is a covering set and C
is a collection of covering sets. The procedure outputs Q if Q ∈ C and ∅ otherwise. (We adopted an eﬃcient implementation 
of such procedure which can run in O (|T (s)|). More precisely, we represent a covering set Q as a binary vector of length 
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represented as a binary tree with depth |T (s)|. The membership of a covering set Q to collection C is represented with 
a branch of the tree in such a way that if ti ∈ Q then we have a left edge at depth i − 1 on such branch. We can easily 
determine if Q ∈ C by checking if traversing a left (right) edge in the tree each time we read a 1 (0) in Q ’s binary vector 
we reach a leaf node at depth |T (s)|. The insertion of a new covering set in the collection can be done in the same way by 
traversing existing edges and expanding the tree where necessary.) If the newly generated covering set is not present in its 
collection or is already present with a higher cost (Step 10), then collection and cost are updated (Steps 11 and 12).
Algorithm 1 DP-ComputeCovSets(v, s).
1: ∀t ∈ T (s): C0v,v = {∅}
2: c(∅) = 0
3: for all k ∈ {1 . . . |T (s)|} do
4: for all t ∈ T (s) do
5: for all Q k−1v,t ∈ Ck−1v,t do
6: Q + = {w ∈ T (s) | Conditions 1–3 are satisﬁed}
7: for all w ∈ Q + do
8: Q kv,w = Q k−1v,t ∪ {w}
9: U = Search(Q kv,w , Ckv,w )
10: if c(U ) > c(Q k−1v,t ) + ω∗t,w then
11: Ckv,w = Ckv,w ∪ {Q kv,w }
12: c(Q kv,w ) = c(Q k−1v,t ) + ω∗t,w
13: return {Ckv,t : t ∈ T (s), k ≤ |T (s)|}
After Algorithm 1 completed its execution, for any arbitrary T ′ ⊆ T we can easily obtain the temporal cost of its shortest 
covering route as
c∗(T ′) = min
Q ∈Y |T ′ |
c(Q )
where Y |T ′| = ∪t∈T ′ {Search(T ′, C|T
′|
v,t )} (notice that if T ′ is not a covering set then c∗(T ′) = ∞). For the sake of simplicity, 
Algorithm 1 does not specify how to carry out two sub-tasks we describe in the following.
The ﬁrst one is the annotation of dominated covering sets. Each time Steps 11 and 12 are executed, a covering set is added 
to some collection. Let us call it Q and assume it has cardinality k. Each time a new Q has to be included at cardinality k, 
we mark all the covering sets at cardinality k − 1 that are dominated by Q (Deﬁnition 5). The number of sets that can be 
dominated is in the worst case |Q | since each of them has to be searched in collection Ck−1v,t for each feasible terminal t and, 
if found, marked as dominated. The number of terminal targets and the cardinality of Q are at most n and, as described 
above, the Search procedure takes O (|T (s)|). Therefore, dominated covering sets can be annotated with a O (|T (s)|3) extra 
cost at each iteration of Algorithm 1. We can only mark and not delete dominated covering sets since they can generate 
non-dominated ones in the next iteration.
The second task is the generation of routes. To do this we maintain a list of generating routes by iteratively appending 
terminal vertex w to the generative route of Q k−1v,t when set Q k−1v,t ∪ {w} is included in its corresponding collection. At 
the end of the algorithm only routes that correspond to non-dominated covering sets are returned. Maintaining such a list 
introduces a O (1) cost.
Theorem 6. Algorithm 1 is an exact algorithm and has worst-case complexity of O (|T (s)|22|T (s)|) since it has to compute covering sets 
up to cardinality |T (s)|. With annotations of dominances and routes generation the whole algorithm yields a worst-case complexity of 
O (|T (s)|52|T (s)|).
Notice that the algorithm is exact since it is based on an enumeration procedure.
Example 3. We provide a simple example of execution of Algorithm 1. Consider a problem instance with a single signal, 
arbitrary target values while topology and penetration times are as follow:
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k = 0 k = 1 k = 2 k = 3
∅, c = 0 Q 1v,t3 = {t3}, c = 1 Q 2v,t1 = {t1, t3}, c = 2 Q 3v,t2 = {t1, t2, t3}, c = 3
Q 3v,t4 = {t1, t3, t4}, c = 4
Q 2v,t2 = {t2, t3}, c = 2 Q 3v,t1 = {t1, t2, t3}, c = 3
Q 3v,t4 = {t2, t3, t4}, c = 4
Q 2v,t4 = {t3, t4}, c = 2 Q 3v,t1 = {t1, t3, t4}, c = 4,
Q 3v,t2 = {t2, t3, t4}, c = 4,♦
Q 1v,t4 = {t4}, c = 1 Q 2v,t3 = {t3, t4}, c = 2 Q 3v,t1 = {t1, t3, t4}, c = 3,
Q 3v,t2 = {t2, t3, t4}, c = 3,
Notice that Constraint 3 intervenes both when expanding covering sets with k = 1 and k = 2. In the table, c indicates the 
temporal cost of the relative covset while the covset marked with  dominates the one marked with ♦ while the covset 
marked with  dominates the one marked with .
3.2.2. Approximation algorithm
The dynamic programming algorithm presented in the previous section cannot be directly adopted to approximate the 
maximal covering routes. We notice that even in the case we introduce a logarithmic upper bound over the size of the 
covering sets generated by Algorithm 1, we could obtain a number of routes that is O (2log
2(|T (s)|)), and therefore exponential. 
Thus, our goal is to design a polynomial-time algorithm that generates a polynomial number of good covering routes. We 
observe that if we have a total order over the vertices and we work over a complete graph of the targets where each edge 
corresponds to the shortest path, we can ﬁnd in polynomial time the maximal covering routes subject to the constraint that, 
given any pair of targets t, t′ in a route, t can precede t′ in the route only if t precedes t′ in the order. We call monotonic
a route satisfying a given total order. Algorithm 2 returns the maximal monotonic covering routes when the total order is 
lexicographic (trivially, to change the order, it is suﬃcient to re-label the targets).
Algorithm 2 is based on dynamic programming and works as follows. R(k, l) is a matrix storing in each cell one route, 
while L(k, l) is a matrix storing in each cell the maximum lateness of the corresponding route (see below for the meaning 
of k and l). The maximum lateness of a route r captures the maximum delay between a target’s ﬁrst visit and its deadline. 
Formally, it is deﬁned as maxt∈T (s) Ar(t) − d(t). The route stored in R(k, l) is the one with the minimum lateness among 
all the monotonic ones covering l targets where tk is the ﬁrst visited target. Thus, basically, when l = 1, R(k, l) contains 
the route 〈v, tk〉, while, when l > 1, R(k, l) is deﬁned appending to R(k, 1) the best (in terms of minimizing the maximum 
lateness) route R(k′, l − 1) for every k′ > k, in order to satisfy the total order. The whole set of routes in R are returned.8
The complexity of Algorithm 2 is O (|T (s)|3), except the time needed to ﬁnd all the shortest paths.
Algorithm 2 MonotonicLongestRoute(v, s).
1: ∀k, k′ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |T (s)|}, R(k, k′) = ∅, L(k, k′) = +∞, CR (k) = ∅, CL(k) = +∞
2: for all ∀k ∈ {|T (s)|, |T (s)| − 1, . . . , 1} do
3: for all ∀l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |T (s)|} do
4: if l = 1 then
5: R(k, l) = 〈v, tk〉
6: L(k, l) = ω∗v,tk − d(tk)
7: else
8: for all k′ s.t. |T (s)| ≥ k′ > |T (s)| − k do
9: CR (k′) = 〈R(k, 1), R(k′, l − 1)〉
10: CL(k′) =max{L(k, 1), ω∗v,tk + ω∗tk ,k′ −ω∗v,k′ + L(k′, l − 1)}
11: j = argmin j{CL( j)}
12: if CL( j) ≤ 0 then
13: R(k, l) ← CR ( j)
14: L(k, l) ← CL( j)
15: return R
We use different total orders (breaking ties randomly) over the set of targets, collecting all the routes generated using 
each total order:
• increasing order ω∗v,t : the rationale is that targets close to v will be visited before targets far from v;• increasing order d(t): the rationale is that targets with short deadlines will be visited before targets with long deadlines;
• increasing order d(t) − ω∗v,t (we call this quantity excess time): the rationale is that targets with short excess time will 
be visited before targets with long excess time.
8 We notice that dominance can be applied to discard dominated routes. However, in this case, the improvement would be negligible since the total 
number of routes, including the non-dominated ones, is polynomial.
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1: CLmax ← ∅
2: CLmin ← ∅
3: for all t ∈ T (s) do
4: if ω∗v,t ≤ d(t) then
5: Tree-Search(ρ · |T (s)|, 〈v, t〉)
6: return CLmax
In addition, we use a random restart generating random permutations over the targets.
Theorem 7. Algorithm 2 provides an approximation with ratio ( 1|T (s)| ).
Proof sketch. The worst case for the approximation ratio of our algorithm occurs when the covering route including all the 
targets exists and each covering route returned by our heuristic algorithm visits only one target. In that case, the optimal 
expected utility of D is 1. Our algorithm, in the worst case in which π(t) = 1 for every target t , returns an approximation 
ratio ( 1|T (s)| ). It is straightforward to see that, in other cases, the approximation ratio is larger. 
3.3. Branch-and-bound algorithms
The dynamic programming algorithm presented in the previous section essentially implements a breadth-ﬁrst search. In 
some speciﬁc situations, depth-ﬁrst search could outperform breadth-ﬁrst search, e.g., when penetration times are relaxed 
and good heuristics lead a depth-ﬁrst search to ﬁnd in a brief time the maximal covering route, avoiding to scan an expo-
nential number of routes as the breadth-ﬁrst search would do. In this section, we adopt the branch-and-bound approach 
to design both an exact algorithm and an approximation algorithm. In particular, in Section 3.3.1 we describe our exact 
algorithm, while in Section 3.3.2 we present the approximation one.
3.3.1. Exact algorithm
Our branch-and-bound algorithm (see Algorithm 3) is a tree-search based algorithm working on the space of the covering 
routes and returning a set of covering routes R . It works as follows.
Initial step. We exploit two global set variables, CLmin and CLmax initially set to empty (Steps 1–2 of Algorithm 3). These 
variables contain closed covering routes, namely covering routes which cannot be further expanded without violating the 
penetration time of at least one target during the visit. CLmax contains the covering routes returned by the algorithm, while 
CLmin is used for pruning as discussed below. Given a starting vertex v and a signal s, for each target t ∈ T (s) such that 
ω∗v,t ≤ d(t) we generate a covering route r = 〈v, t〉 with r(0) = v and r(1) = t (Steps 5 of Algorithm 3). Thus, D has at least 
one covering route per target that can be covered in time from v . Notice that if, for some t , such minimal route does not 
exist, then target t cannot be covered (even the shortest path from the starting vertex v cannot guarantee capture). This 
does not guarantee that A will attack t with full probability since, depending on the values π , A could ﬁnd more proﬁtable 
to randomize over a different set of targets. The meaning of parameter ρ (used in Line 5 of Algorithm 3) is described below.
Route expansions. The subsequent steps essentially evolve on each branch according to a depth-ﬁrst search with back-
tracking limited by ρ . The choice of ρ directly inﬂuences the behavior of the algorithm and consequently its complexity. 
Each node in the search tree represents a route r built so far starting from an initial route 〈v, t〉. At each iteration, route 
r is expanded by inserting a new target at a particular position. We denote with r+(q, p) the route obtained by inserting 
target q after the p-th target in r. Notice that every expansion of r will preserve the relative order with which targets 
already present in r will be visited. The collection of all the feasible expansions r+s (i.e., the ones that are covering routes) 
is denoted by R+ and it is ordered according to a heuristic that we describe below. Algorithm 6, described below, is used 
to generate R+ (Step 1 of Algorithm 4). In each open branch (i.e., R+ = ∅), if the depth of the node in the tree is smaller or 
equal to ρ · |T (s)| then backtracking is disabled (Steps 7–10 of Algorithm 4), while, if the depth is larger than such value, 
is enabled (Steps 5–6 of Algorithm 4). This is equivalent to ﬁx the relative order of the ﬁrst (at most) ρ · |T (s)| inserted 
targets in the current route. In this case, with ρ = 0 we do not rely on the heuristics at all, full backtracking is enabled, 
the tree is fully expanded and the returned R is complete, i.e., it contains all the non-dominated covering routes. Route r
is repeatedly expanded in a greedy fashion until no insertion is possible. As a result, Algorithm 4 generates at most |T (s)|
covering routes.
Pruning. Algorithm 5 is in charge of updating CLmin and CLmax each time a route r cannot be expanded and, conse-
quently, the associated branch must be closed. We call CLmin the minimal set of closed routes. This means that a closed 
route r belongs to CLmin only if CLmin does not already contain another r′ ⊆ r. Steps 1–4 of Algorithm 5 implement such 
condition: ﬁrst, in Steps 2–3 any route r′ such that r′ ⊇ r is removed from CLmin , then route r is inserted in CLmin . Routes 
in CLmin are used by Algorithm 6 in Steps 2 and 6 for pruning during the search. More precisely, a route r is not expanded 
with a target q at position p if there exists a route r′ ∈ CLmin such that r′ ⊆ r+(q, p). This pruning rule is safe since by def-
inition if r′ ∈ CLmin , then all the possible expansions of r′ are unfeasible and if r′ ⊆ r then r can be obtained by expanding 
from r′ . This pruning mechanism explains why once a route r is closed is always inserted in CLmin without checking the 
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1: R+ = {r(1), r(2), . . .} ← Expand(r)
2: if R+ = ∅ then
3: Close(r)
4: else
5: if k > 0 then
6: Tree-Search (k − 1, r(1))
7: else
8: for all r+ ∈ R+ do
9: Tree-Search (0, r+)
10: Close(r+)
Algorithm 5 Close(r).
1: for all r′ ∈ CLmin do
2: if r ⊆ r′ then
3: CLmin = CLmin \ {r′}
4: CLmin = CLmin ∪ {r}
5: for all r′ ∈ CLmax do
6: if r ⊆ r′ then
7: return
8: CLmax = CLmax ∪ {r}
insertion against the presence in CLmin of a route r′′ such that r′′ ⊆ r. Indeed, if such route r′′ would be included in CLmin
we would not be in the position of closing r, having r being pruned before by Algorithm 6.
We use CLmax to maintain a set of the generated maximal closed routes. This means that a closed route r is inserted 
here only if CLmax does not already contain another r′ such that r′ ⊇ r. This set keeps track of closed routes with maximum 
number of targets. Algorithm 5 maintains this set by inserting a closed route r in Step 12 only if no route r′ ⊇ r is already 
present in CLmax . Once the whole algorithm terminates, CLmax contains the ﬁnal solution.
Heuristic function. A key component of this algorithm is the heuristic function that drives the search. The heuristic 
function is deﬁned as hr : {T (s) \ T (r)} × {1 . . . |T (r)|} → Z, where hr(t′, p) evaluates the cost of expanding r by inserting 
target t′ after the p-th target of r. The basic idea, inspired by [37], is to adopt a conservative approach, trying to preserve 
feasibility. Given a route r, let us deﬁne the possible forward shift of r as the minimum temporal margin in r between the 
arrival at a target t and d(t): 
P F S(r) = min
t∈T (r)(d(t) − Ar(t))
The extra mileage er(t′, p) for inserting target t′ after position p is the additional traveling cost to be paid: 
er(t
′, p) = (Ar(r(t′)) +ω∗r(p),t′ + ω∗t′,r(p+1)) − Ar(r(p + 1))
The advance time that such insertion gets with respect to d(t′) is deﬁned as: 
ar(t
′, p) = d(t′) − (Ar(r(p)) + ω∗r(p),t′)
Finally, hr(t′, p) is deﬁned as: 
hr(t
′, p) =min{ar(t′, p); (P F S(r) − er(t′, p))}
We partition the set T (s) in two sets Ttight and Tlarge , where t ∈ Ttight if d(t) < δ · ω∗v,t and t ∈ Tlarge otherwise (δ ∈R is 
a parameter). The previous inequality is a non-binding choice we made to discriminate targets with a tight penetration time 
from those with a large one. Initially, we insert all the tight targets and only subsequently we insert the non-tight targets. 
We use the two sets according to the following rules (see Algorithm 6):
• the insertion of a target belonging to Ttight is always preferred to the insertion of a target belonging to Tlarge , indepen-
dently of the insertion position;
• insertions of t ∈ Ttight are ranked according to h considering ﬁrst the insertion position and then the target;
• insertions of t ∈ Tlarge are ranked according to h considering ﬁrst the target and then the insertion position.
The rationale behind this rule is that targets with a tight penetration time should be inserted ﬁrst and at their best positions. 
On the other hand, targets with a large penetration time can be covered later. Therefore, in this last case, it is less important 
which target to cover than when to cover it.
Theorem 8. Algorithm 3 with ρ = 0 is an exact algorithm and has an exponential computational complexity since it builds a full tree 
of covering routes, with worst-case size O (|T (s)||T (s)|).
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1: if Ttight  T (r) then
2: for all q ∈ Ttight \ T (r) do





q ) ≥ hr(q, p(i+1)q )
r+(q, p(i)q ) is a covering route
 ∃v ′ ∈ CLmin : r′ ⊆ r+(q, p(i)q )
3: Q = {q(1), q(2), . . . , q(c)} s.t. ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , c}, hr(q(i), p(1)q(i) ) ≥ hr(q(i+1), p
(1)
q(i+1) )
4: R+ = {r(1), r(2), . . . r(k)} where
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
r(1) = r+(q(1), p(1)
q(1)
)
· · · = · · ·
r(k) = r+(q(c), p(b)
q(c)
)
5: if Tlarge  T (r) then
6: for all u ∈ Tlarge \ T (r) do





p , p) ≥ hr(q(i+1)p , p)
r+(q(i)p , p) is a covering route
 ∃ r′ ∈ CLmin : r′ ⊆ r+(q(i)p , p)




8: R+ = R+ ∪ {r(k+1), r(k+2), . . . r(K )} where
⎧⎨
⎩
r(k+1) = r+(q(1)p , p(1))
· · · = · · ·
r(K ) = r+(q(b)p , p(c))
9: return R+
3.3.2. Approximation algorithm
Since ρ determines the completeness degree of the generated tree, we can exploit Algorithm 3 tuning ρ to obtain an 
approximation algorithm that is faster w.r.t. the exact one.
In fact, when ρ < 1 completeness is not guaranteed in favor of a less computational effort. In this case, the only guaran-
tees that can be provided for each covering route r ∈ CLmax , once the algorithm terminates are:
• no other r′ ∈ CLmax dominates r;
• no other r′ /∈ CLmax such that r ⊆ r′ dominates r. Notice this does not prevent the existence of a route r′′ not returned 
by the algorithm that visits targets T (r) in a different order and that dominates r.
When ρ is chosen as k|T (s)| (where k ∈N is a parameter), the complexity of generating covering routes becomes polynomial 
in the size of the input. We can state the following theorem, whose proof is analogous to that one of Theorem 7.
Theorem 9. Algorithm 4 with ρ = k|T (s)| provides an approximation with ratio ( 1|T (s)| ) and runs in O (|T (s)|3) given that heuristic 
hr can be computed in O (|T (s)|2).
3.4. Solving SRG-v
Now we can formulate the problem of computing the optimal signal–response strategy for D. Let us denote with σDv,s(r)
the probability with which D plays route r under signal s and with Rv,s the set of all the routes available to D generated 
by some algorithm. We introduce function UA(r, t), representing the utility function of A and deﬁned as follows: 
UA(r, t) =
{
π(t) if t ∈ r
0 otherwise
.




p(s | t) ∑
r∈Rv,s
σDv,s(r)UA(r, t) ≤ gv ∀t ∈ T∑
r∈Rv,s
σDv,s(r) = 1 ∀s ∈ S
σDv,s(r) ≥ 0 ∀r ∈ Rv,s, s ∈ S
The size of the mathematical program is composed of |T | + |S| constraints (excluded ≥ 0 constraints) and O (|V ||S|
maxv,s{|Rv,s|}) variables. This shows that the hardness is due only to maxv,s{|Rv,s|}, which, in its turn, depends only on 
|T (s)|. We provide the following remark.
Remark 3. We observe that the discretization of the environment as a graph is as accurate as the number of vertices is 
large, corresponding to reduce the size of the areas associated with each vertex, as well as to reduce the temporal interval 
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of vertices requires polynomial time.
4. Patrolling game
In this section, we focus on the PG. Speciﬁcally, in Section 4.1 we state our main result showing that patrolling is not 
necessary when an alarm system is present, in Section 4.2 we propose the algorithm to deal with the PG, in Section 4.3 we 
summarize the complexity results about Questions 1–4.
4.1. Stand still
We focus on the problem of ﬁnding the best patrolling strategy given that we know the best signal–response strategy 
for each vertex v in which D can place. Given the current vertex of D and the sequence of the last, say n, vertices visited 
by D (where n is a tradeoff between effectiveness of the solution and computational effort), a patrolling strategy is usually 
deﬁned as a randomization over the next adjacent vertices [9]. We deﬁne v∗ = argminv∈V {gv}, where gv is the value 
returned by the optimization problem described in Section 3.4, as the vertex that guarantees the maximum expected utility 
to D over all the SRG-vs. We show that the maxmin equilibrium strategy in PG prescribes that D places at v∗ , waits for a 
signal, and responds to it.
Theorem 10. Without false positives and missed detections, if ∀t ∈ T we have that |S(t)| ≥ 1, then any patrolling strategy is dominated 
by the placement in v∗.
Proof. Any patrolling strategy different from the placement in v∗ should necessarily visit a vertex v ′ = v∗ . Since the alarm 
system is not affected by missed detections, every attack will raise a signal that, in turn, will raise a response yielding an 
utility of gx where x is the current position of D at the moment of the attack. Since A can observe the current position of 
D before attacking, x = argmaxv∈P {gv} where P is the set of the vertices patrolled by D. Obviously, for any P ⊇ {v∗} we 
would have that gx ≥ gv∗ and therefore placing at v∗ and waiting for a signal is the best strategy for D. 
The rationale is based upon the fact that, without false positives and missed detections, the signal response strategy 
solely depends on the current vertex occupied by D and on the generated signal (not depending then on previously visited 
vertices). So, if the patrolling strategy of D prescribes to patrol a set of vertices, say V ′ , then, since A can observe the 
position of D, the best strategy of A is to wait for D being in v ′ = argmaxv∈V ′ {gv} and then to attack. Thus, by deﬁnition 
of gv∗ , if D leaves v∗ to patrol additional vertices the expected utility it receives is no larger than that it receives from 
staying in v∗ .
The validity of Theorem 10 goes beyond the model studied in this work. Indeed, it can be easily shown how such re-
sults keep valid when having multiple resource controlled by D. Also, a deeper analysis of Theorem 10 can show that its 
scope does include cases where missed detections are present up to a non-negligible extent. For such cases, placement-
based strategies keep being optimal even in the case when the alarm systems fails in detecting an attack. We encode the 
occurrence of this robustness property in the following proposition, which we shall prove by a series of examples.
Proposition 1. There exist Patrolling Games where staying in a vertex, waiting for a signal, and responding to it is the optimal patrolling 
strategy for D even with a missed detection rate α = 0.5.
Proof. The expected utility for D given by the placement in v∗ is (1 − α)(1 − gv∗), where (1 − α) is the probability with 
which the alarm system correctly generates a signal upon an attack and (1 − gv∗ ) denotes D’s payoff when placed in v∗ . 
A non-placement-based patrolling strategy will prescribe, by deﬁnition, to move between at least two vertices. From this 
simple consideration, we observe that an upper bound to the expected utility of any non-placement strategy is entailed by 
the case where D alternately patrols vertices v∗ and v∗2, where v∗2 is the second best vertex in which D can statically place. 
Such scenario gives us an upper bound over the expected utility of non-placement strategies, namely 1 − gv∗2 . It follows that 
a suﬃcient condition for the placement in v∗ being optimal is given by the following inequality: 
(1− α)(1− gv∗) > (1− gv∗2). (1)
To prove Proposition 1, it then suﬃces to provide a Patrolling Game instance where Equation (1) holds under some non-
null missed detection rate α. In Fig. 4(a) and Fig. 4(b), we report two of such examples. The depicted settings have unitary 
edges except where explicitly indicated. For both, without missed detections, the best patrolling strategy is a placement 
v∗ = 4. When allowing missed detections, in Fig. 4(a) it holds that gv∗ = 0 and gv∗2 = 0.75, where v∗ = 4 and v∗2 = 1. Thus, 
by Equation (1), placement v∗ = 4 is the optimal strategy for α ≤ 0.25. Under the same reasoning scheme, in Fig. 4(b) we 
have that gv∗ = 0 and gv∗2 = 0.5, making the placement v∗ = 4 optimal for any α ≤ 0.5. 
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Algorithm 7 BestPlacement(G , s).
1: U (v) ← 0 for every v ∈ V
2: for all v ∈ V do
3: U (v) ← SolveSRG(v)
4: return max(U )
It is reasonable to expect that a similar result holds also for the case with false positives. However, dealing with false 
positives is much more intricate than handling false negatives and requires new models. For example, D could respond to 
an alarm signal only with a given probability and with the remaining probability could stay in the current vertex. For this 
reason, we leave the treatment of false positives and a more accurate treatment of false negatives to future works.
4.2. Computing the best placement
Under the absence of false positives and missed detections, Theorem 10 simpliﬁes the computation of the patrolling 
strategy by reducing it to the problem of ﬁnding v∗ . To such aim, we must solve a SRG-v for each possible starting ver-
tex v and select the one with the maximum expected utility for D. Algorithm 7 depicts the solving algorithm. Function 
SolveSRG(v) returns the optimal value 1 − gv∗ . The complexity is linear in |V |, once gv has been calculated for every v .
Since all the vertices are possible starting points, we should face this hard problem (see Theorem 1) |V | times, comput-
ing, for each signal, the covering routes from all the vertices. To avoid this issue, we ask whether there exists an algorithm 
that in the worst case allows us to consider a number of iterations such that solving the problem for a given starting vertex 
v could help us ﬁnding the solution for another starting vertex v ′ . In other words, considering a speciﬁc set of targets, we 
wonder whether a solution for COV-SET with starting vertex v can be used to derive, in polynomial time, a solution to COV-
SET for another starting vertex v ′ . This would allow us to solve an exponential-time problem only once instead of solving 
it for each vertex of the graph. To answer this question, we resort to hardness results for reoptimization, also called locally 
modiﬁed problems [38]. We show that, even if we know all the covering routes from a starting vertex, once we changed the 
starting vertex selecting an adjacent one, ﬁnding the covering routes from the new starting vertex is hard.
Deﬁnition 10 (lm–COV–ROUTE). A locally modiﬁed covering route (lm–COV–ROUTE) problem is deﬁned as follows:
INSTANCE: graph G = (V , E), a set of targets T with penetration times d, two starting vertices v1 and v2 that are adjacent, 
and a covering route r1 with r1(0) = v1 such that T (r1) = T .
QUESTION: is there r2 with r2(0) = v2 and T (r2) = T ?
Theorem 11. lm–COV–ROUTE is NP-complete.
This shows that iteratively applying Algorithm 1 to SRG-v for each starting vertex v and then choosing the vertex with 
the highest utility is the best we can do in the worst case.
238 N. Basilico et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 246 (2017) 220–257Table 1
Computational complexity of discussed questions.
Question Topology
Tree Arbitrary
Question 1 FNP-hard APX-hard
Question 2 NP-hard NP-hard
Question 3 NP-hard NP-hard
Question 4 NP-hard NP-hard
Question 2 LM? NP-hard
4.3. Summary of results
We summarize our computational results about Questions 1–4 in Table 1, including also results about the resolution of 
the PG. We use ‘?’ for the problems remained open in this paper.
5. Experimental evaluation
We implemented our algorithms in MATLAB and we used a 2.33 GHz LINUX machine to run our experiments. For a 
better analysis, we provide two different experimental evaluations. In Section 5.1, we apply our algorithms to worst-case 
instances, in order to evaluate the worst-case performance of the algorithms and to investigate experimentally the gap 
between our APX-hardness result and the theoretical guarantees of our approximation algorithms. In Section 5.2, we apply 
our algorithms to a speciﬁc realistic instance we mentioned in Section 1, Expo 2015.
5.1. Worst-case instances analysis
We evaluate the scalability of Algorithm 1 and the quality of the solution returned by our approximation algorithms for 
a set of instances of SRG-v . We do not include results on the evaluation of the algorithm to solve completely a PG, given 
that it trivially requires asymptotically |V | times the effort required by the resolution of a single instance of SRG-v . In the 
next section we describe our experimental setting, in Section 5.1.2 we provide a quantitative analysis of the exact algorithms 
while in Section 5.1.3 we evaluate the quality of our approximations.
5.1.1. Setting
We can build hard instances for our problem from instances of HAMILTONIAN-PATH (HP). More precisely, these worst-
case instances can be easily reduced from any instance of (HP) showing how they admit a covering route for all the targets 
if and only if the corresponding instance of HP admits an Hamiltonian path. They are deﬁned as follows:
• all the vertices are targets;
• edge costs are set to 1;
• there is only one signal;
• penetration times are set to |T | − 1;
• values are drawn from (0, 1] with uniform probability for all the targets;
• the number of edges is drawn from a normal distribution with mean  , said edge density and deﬁned as  =
|E|/ |T |(|T |−1)2 ;• starting vertex v is drawn among the targets of T with uniform probability.
We explore two parameter dimensions: the number of targets |T | and the value of edge density  . In particular, we use the 
following values:
|T | ∈ {6,8,10,12,14,16,20,25,30,35,40,45,50},
 ∈ {0.05,0.10,0.25,0.50,0.75,1.00}.
For each combination of values of |T | and  , we randomly generate 100 instances with the constraint that, if  |T |22 <|T |, we introduce additional edges in order to assure the graph connectivity. The suitability of our worst-case analysis is 
corroborated by the results obtained with a realistic setting (see Section 5.2), which present hard subproblems characterized 
by the features listed above.
5.1.2. Exact algorithms scalability
We report in Fig. 5 the compute time (averaged over 100 SRG-v instances) required by our exact dynamic programming 
algorithm (Algorithm 1), with the annotation of dominated covering sets and the generation of the routes, as |T | and 
vary. We report in Appendix C the boxplots showing the statistical signiﬁcance of the results. It can be observed that the 
compute times are exponential in |T |, the curves being lines in a semilogarithmic plot, and the value of  determines the 
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Fig. 6. Ratios evaluating dominances with  = 0.25 as |T | varies.
slope of the line. Notice that with  ∈ {0.05, 0.10, 0.25} the number of edges is almost the same when |T | ≤ 16 due to the 
constraint of connectivity of the graph, leading thus to the same compute times. Beyond 16 targets, the compute times of 
our exact dynamic programming algorithm are excessively long (with only  = 0.25, the compute time when |T | = 20 is 
lower than 104 seconds). Interestingly, the compute time monotonically decreases as  decreases. This is thanks to the fact 
that the number of covering sets generated by Algorithm 1 dramatically reduces as  reduces.
We do not report any plot of the compute times of our exact branch-and-bound algorithm, since it requires more than 
104 seconds when |T | > 8 even with  = 0.25, resulting thus non-applicable in practice. This is because the branch-and-
bound algorithm has a complexity O (|T ||T |), while the dynamic programming algorithm has a complexity O (2|T |).
Fig. 6 shows the impact of discarding dominated actions from the game when  = 0.25. It depicts the trend of some 
performance ratios for different metrics. We shall call G the complete game including all D’s dominated actions and GR the 
reduced game; CCS will denote the full version of Algorithm 1 and LP will denote the linear program to solve SRG-v . Each 
instance is solved for a random starting vertex v; we report average ratios for 100 instances. “n. covsets” is the ratio between 
the number of covering sets in GR and in G . As it can be seen, non-dominated actions constitute a small percentage, 
decreasing with the number of targets. This result indicates that the structure of the problem exhibits a non-negligible 
degree of redundancy. LP times (iterations) report the ratio between GR and G for the time (iterations) required to solve 
the maxmin linear program. A relative gain directly proportional to the percentage of dominated covering sets is observable 
(LP has less variables and constraints). A similar trend is not visible when considering the same ratio for the total time, that 
is LP+ CCS. Indeed, the time needed by CCS largely exceed LP’s and removal of dominated actions determines a polynomial 
additional cost, which can be seen in the slightly increasing trend of the curve. The relative gap between LP and CCS 
compute times can be assessed by looking at the LP/CCS curve: when more targets are considered, the time taken by LP is 
negligible w.r.t. CCS’s. This shows that removing dominated actions is useful, allowing a small improvement in the average 
case, and assuring an exponential improvement in the worst case.
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Table 2
Compute times (in seconds) for multi-signal instances.
m |T (s)|
5 10 15
2 – 17.83 510.61
3 – 33.00 769.30
4 0.55 35.35 1066.76
5 0.72 52.43 1373.32
Fig. 7 shows the game value for D, 1 − gv , as |T | and  vary (averaged over 100 instances). It can be observed that the 
game value is almost constant as |T | varies for  ∈ {0.05, 0.10, 0.25} and it is about 0.87. This is because all these instances 
have a similar number of edges, very close to the minimum number necessary for having connected graphs. With a larger 
number of edges, the game value increases. Interestingly, ﬁxed a value of  , there is a threshold of |T | such that beyond the 
threshold the game value increases as |T | increases. This suggests that the minimum game value is obtained for connected 
graphs with the minimum number of edges.
In Table 2, we report compute times with multiple signals, where the targets covered by a signal and the probability that 
a target triggers a signal are randomly chosen according to a uniform distribution. Values are averages over 100 random 
instances and give insights on the computation effort along the considered dimensions. The results show that the problem 
is computationally challenging even for a small number of targets and signals.
5.1.3. Approximation algorithms
We evaluate the empirical approximation ratios obtained with our approximation algorithms as (1 − gˆv)/(1 − gv), where 
gv is the expected utility of A at the equilibrium considering all the covering sets and gˆv is the expected utility of A
at the equilibrium when covering sets are generated by our heuristic algorithm. We execute our approximation dynamic 
programming algorithm with a different number, say RandRes, of randomly generated orders from {10, 20, 30, 40, 50}, in 
addition to the 3 heuristics discussed in Section 3.2.2. We executed our approximation branch and bound algorithm with 
constant values of ρ from {0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 1.00} (we recall that with ρ = 1.00 backtracking is completely disabled).
Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 report the empirical approximation ratios (averaged over 100 instances) obtained with our approximation 
algorithms for different values of |T | ∈ {6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16}, i.e., the instances for which we know the optimal game value, 
and  ∈ {0.05, 0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 1.00}. We remark that the ratios obtained with the approximation branch-and-bound 
algorithm for some values of ρ are omitted. This is because the compute time needed by the algorithm is over 104 seconds. 
The algorithm always terminates by the deadline for only ρ ∈ {0.75, 1.00}.
We focus on the ratios obtained with the dynamic programming algorithm. Given a value of  , as |T | increases, the 
ratio decreases up to a given threshold of |T | and then it is a constant. The threshold increases as  decreases, while the 
constant decreases as  decreases. The value of the constant is high for every  , being larger than 0.8. Although the ratios 
increase as RandRes increases, it is worth noting that the increase is not very signiﬁcant, being of the order of 0.05 between 
10 RandRes and 50 RandRes. We focus on the ratios obtained with the branch-and-bound algorithm. Given a value of  , 
as |T | increases, the ratio decreases up to a given threshold of |T | and then it increases approaching a ratio of 1. The 
threshold increases as  decreases, while the minimum ratio decreases as  decreases. Interestingly, ratios with ρ = 1.00
are very close to ratios with ρ = 0.75, showing that performing even signiﬁcant backtracking around the solution found 
with ρ = 1.00 does not lead to a signiﬁcant improvement of the solution. The solution can be effectively improved only 
with ρ = 0.25, but it is not affordable due to the excessive required compute time. This shows that the heuristic performs 
very well. Comparing the ratios of the two algorithms, it can be observed that the approximation dynamic programming 
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algorithm performs better than the approximation branch-and-bound algorithm although this last one turned out to be 
slightly better in a limited number of cases (see Fig. 10). While the dynamic programming one always provides a ratio 
larger than 0.8, the branch-and-bound one provides for combinations of |T | and  ratios lower than 0.4.
Fig. 10 reports the game values obtained with the approximation dynamic programming algorithm for every value of 
RandRes and with the approximation branch-and-bound algorithm when |T | ∈ {20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, 50} only for ρ = 1.00. 
Indeed, with ρ = 0.75 the compute time is excessive and, as shown above, the purely heuristic solution cannot be signif-
icantly improved for  ≥ 0.75. We report experimental results only for  ∈ {0.05, 0.25}. We notice that for these instances 
we do not have the optimal game value. However, since the optimal game value cannot be larger than 1 by construction of 
the instances, the game value obtained with our approximation algorithms represents a lower bound to the actual approxi-
mation ratio. It can be observed that, given a value of  , the ratios obtained with the dynamic programming algorithm are 
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essentially constant as |T | increases and this constant reduced as  reduces. Surprisingly, after a certain value of |T |, the 
game values obtained with the branch and bound algorithm are higher than those obtained with the dynamic programming 
algorithm. This is because, ﬁxed a value of  , as |T | increases, the problem becomes easier and the heuristic used by the 
branch and bound algorithm performs well ﬁnding the best covering routes. This shows that there is not an algorithm out-
performing the other for every combination of parameters |T | and  . Furthermore, the above result shows that the worst 
cases for the approximation algorithms are those in which  = O ( 1|T | ), corresponding to instances in which the number of 
edges per vertex is a constant in |T |. It is not clear from our experimental analysis whether increasing |T | with  = ν|T | for 
some ν > 1 the game value approaches to 0 or to a strictly positive value. However, our approximation algorithms provide 
a very good approximation even with a large number of targets and a small value of  .
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Fig. 11. Compute times as |T | varies.
Fig. 11 reports the compute times required by the approximation dynamic programming algorithms. As it can be seen, 
the required time slightly increases when adopting a larger number of randomly generated orders with respect to the 
baseline with ρ = 1.00.
5.2. Real case study
In Section 1.1.2 we presented a motivating scenario describing the fair site of Expo 2015. We now formalize an in-
stance for our problem inspired by such scenario to derive important insights on how our techniques operate in real cases. 
Expo 2015 has been a large setting which, as we anticipated, underwent a remarkable deployment of security resources 
with about 700 guards operating on the ﬁeld. This experiment addresses a worst-case scenario where we stress our route-
generation algorithms by assuming that each guard has to protect the whole environment. The resolution of this problem is 
necessary even when admitting multiple defending resources for which no environment partition is pre-assigned (see [27]
for a more detailed discussion).
Fig. 12 shows a graph representation of the Expo 2015 site. We manually build a discretized version of the site map by 
exploiting publicly available knowledge of the event.9 We identify ≈170 sensible locations which correspond to an equal 
number of targets in our graph. More speciﬁcally, we identify ≈130 targets located at the entrances of each pavilion and in 
the surroundings of those areas which could be of interest for a high number of visitors. Some targets (≈35) are located over 
the main roads, being these critical mainly due to their high crowd. Such roads also deﬁne our set of edges which resulted 
in a density of ≈0.02. Fig. 12 reports a graphical representation of chosen deadlines d(·) and values π(·), respectively. To 
9 Detailed information can be found at http :/ /www.expo2015 .org/ while the map we used for our experiments can be viewed at https :/ /goo .gl /jXPkky.
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determine such values in a reasonable way we apply a number of simple rules of thumb. First, to ease our task, we discretize 
the spaces of possible deadlines and values in four different levels. To assign a value to a target, we estimate the interest (in 
terms of popularity and expected crowd) of the corresponding area in the fair site. The higher the interest, the higher the 
value (actual values are reported in the ﬁgure). To assign deadlines we estimate the time an attacker should spend to escape 
from the attacked target after some malicious activity is started (for example, blending into the crowd without leaving any 
trace). In particular, we estimate a smaller escape time for those locations lying near the external border of the fair site 
while for locations that are more central we estimated a larger time. The smaller the escape time, the tighter the deadline 
for that target. Actual values are extracted from a normal distribution where σ 2 = 1 and μ is set according to the chosen 
level. The maximum distance between any two target locations is about 1.5 km which we assume can be covered in about 
7.5 minutes (we imagined a crowded scenario). Given such reference scenario, our means span from 5 minutes (very tight) 
to 7.5 minutes (very large). To derive our alarm system model we assume to have a number of panoramic cameras deployed 
in the environment at locations we manually choose in order to cover the whole environment and to guarantee a wide area 
of view for each camera (i.e., trying to keep, in general, more than one target under each camera’s view). To map our set 
of cameras over the alarm system model, we adopt this convention: each group of cameras sharing an independent partial 
view of a target t is associated to a signal s ∈ S(t); if target t is covered by k signals then each signal is generated with 
probability 1/k once t is attacked. Obviously, a deeper knowledge of the security systems deployed on the site can enable 
speciﬁc methods to set the parameters of our model. This is why we encourage involving agencies in charge of security 
when dealing with such task.
We ﬁrst show a qualitative evaluation of our method. Fig. 13 depicts the best placement for the Defender (the circle in 
the ﬁgure) and the attacked targets (the squares in the ﬁgure, these are the actions played by the Attacker with non-null 
probability at the equilibrium). As intuition would suggest, the best location from where any signal response should start 
is a central one w.r.t. the whole fair site. Our simulations show that the optimal patrolling strategy coincides with such 
ﬁxed placement even under false negatives rates of at least ≈ 0.3. Notice that such false negatives value can be considered 
unrealistically pessimistic for alarm systems deployed in structured environment like the one we are dealing with. Attacked 
targets correspond to areas, which exhibit rather high interest and small escape time. Fig. 14 reports an example of signal 
response strategy for a given starting vertex (the small circle in the ﬁgure) and a given signal (whose covered targets are 
depicted with the large circle in the ﬁgure). The table lists the computed covering sets and the probabilities with which the 
Defender plays the corresponding covering routes.
Boxplots of Fig. 15(a) provide some quantitative insights on the computational effort we measured in solving such real-
istic instance. Given a signal, we report the statistical distribution of the time required by Algorithm 1 to compute covering 
routes from each possible start vertex. In general, we observe a high variance in each boxplot. Indeed, once ﬁxed a signal 
s in our realistic instance, it is easy to identify starting vertices from which computing covering routes is likely to be very 
easy or, instead, much harder. For the easy case, consider a starting vertex lying very much far away from the group of 
targets covered by s. In such case, Algorithm 1 will soon stop iterating through covering set cardinalities being not able to 
further generate feasible sets. Such feature is induced by the large distance of the starting vertex from the targets covered 
by s together with the low edge density and the spatial locality shared among targets covered by the same signal (these 
last two are, indeed, features that frequently recur in realistic scenarios). For the harder case, just consider a situation in 
which the distance of the starting vertex from the targets covered by s is such that a large number of covering routes is 
available. An example of this kind can be inspected in Fig. 14. Interestingly, a similar high variance trend is not always 
observed when depicting the statistical distribution of the compute time per starting vertex. The boxplot of Fig. 15(b) shows 
an example of the distribution of compute time from a given starting vertex (the sample here is the composed by compute 
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Fig. 15. Time boxplots for our real case study.
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a lower variance with respect to what can be observed in Fig. 14) suggests that there can be starting vertices posing easy 
resolution and, similarly, others posing only hard ones.
6. Related works
In the last few years, Security Games received an increasing interest from the Artiﬁcial Intelligence scientiﬁc community, 
leading to the exploration of a large number of research directions around this topic. In this section, we brieﬂy discuss what 
we deem to be the most signiﬁcant ones, starting from the game theoretical foundations on which these models are built.
Computing solution concepts is the central problem upon which the real applicability of these game theoretical models is 
based. A lot of works concentrated on algorithmic studies of this topic, analysing the relationships holding among different 
kinds of solution concepts and their computational complexity. In [39] the relationship between Stackelberg, Nash and 
min–max equilibria is studied, while in [40] some reﬁnements of the Stackelberg equilibrium are proposed. Many efforts 
have been made to develop tractable algorithms for ﬁnding Stackelberg equilibria in Bayesian games [41]. Furthermore, 
in [42], the authors analysed scenarios in which the Defender has multiple objectives, searching for the Pareto curve of the 
Stackelberg equilibria.
Besides fundamental works like the ones cited above, a more recent research line devoted efforts towards the deﬁnition 
of game model reﬁnements in the attempt to overcome some of their ideal assumptions. One remarkable issue belonging 
to this scope is how to model the behavior of the Attacker. In the attempt to have a more realistic behavior, some works 
considered bounded rationality and deﬁned algorithms to deal with it. In [43] different models of the Attacker are analysed 
while in [44,45] the Attacker is allowed to have different observation and planning capabilities. Moreover, in [46] Quantal–
Best Response is used to model the behavior of the Attacker and in [47] algorithms that scale up with bounded rational 
adversaries are proposed. In our paper, we assume that the attacker is rational.
Other model reﬁnements focused on those cases in which games exhibit speciﬁc structures that can be leveraged in the 
design of algorithms to compute the Stackelberg equilibrium. For instance, the study of the spread of contagion over a net-
work is investigated in [48]. When no scheduling constraints are present and payoffs exhibit a special form, the computation 
of a Stackelberg equilibrium can be done very eﬃciently enabling the resolution of remarkably big scenarios [49]. In [50], 
realistic aspects of infrastructures to be protected are taken into account.
7. Conclusions and future research
In this paper we provide the ﬁrst Security Game for large environments surveillance, e.g., for fair sites protection, that 
can exploit an alarm system with spatially uncertain signals. To monitor and protect large infrastructure such as stations, 
airports, and cities, a two-level paradigm is commonly adopted: a broad area surveillance phase, where an attack is detected 
but only approximately localized due to the spatially uncertainty of the alarm system, triggers a local investigation phase, 
where guards have to ﬁnd and clear the attack. Abstracting away from technological details, we propose a simple model of 
alarm systems that can be widely adopted with every speciﬁc technology and we include it in the state-of-art patrolling 
models, obtaining a new security game model. We show that the problem of ﬁnding the best patrolling strategy to respond 
to a given alarm signal is FNP-hard on trees and APX-hard with arbitrary graphs. Then, we provide two exponential-time 
exact algorithms to ﬁnd the best patrolling strategy to respond to a given alarm signal. The ﬁrst algorithm performs a 
breath-ﬁrst search by exploiting a dynamic programming approach, while the second algorithm performs a depth-ﬁrst 
approach by exploiting a branch-and-bound approach. We provide also a variation of these two algorithms to ﬁnd an 
approximate solution. We experimentally evaluate our exact and approximation algorithms both in worst-case instances, to 
evaluate empirically the gap between our hardness results and the theoretical guarantees of our approximation algorithms, 
and in one realistic instance. The limit of our exact algorithms is about 16 targets with worst-case instances while we 
were able to compute an optimal solution for a realistic instance with ≈ 170 targets. On the other side, our approximation 
algorithms provide a very effective approximation even with worst-case instances. Finally, we focus on the problem of 
patrolling the environment, showing that if every target is alarmed and no false positives nor missed detections are present, 
then the best patrolling strategy prescribes that the patroller stays in a given place waiting for an alarm signal. Furthermore, 
we show that such a strategy may be optimal even for missed detection rates up to 50%.
Besides the solutions we studied, a number of open problems have been posed for future research. The main theoretical 
issue is the closure of the approximation gap of SRG-v . We believe that investigating the relationship between our model 
and the DEADLINE–TSP could help in closing the gap. Another interesting problem is the study of approximation algorithms 
for tree graphs. Our NP-hardness result does not exclude the existence of a PTAS (i.e., polynomial time approximation 
scheme), even if we conjecture that the existence is unlikely. A number of extensions of our model are worth being explored, 
we identify two prominent ones. The ﬁrst is to enrich our model with false positives and missed detections, requiring 
patrolling even in the absence of alarm signals. A second extension is to consider settings with multiple patrollers. We 
deem that the techniques presented in this work can play a fundamental role in scaling to multi-patroller settings. In [27]
we give some preliminary contributions along this direction, discussing different arising subproblems, showing how some 
properties like the one given in Theorem 10 can be generalized, and leveraging the algorithms presented here for the 
resolution of multi-patroller games under different coordination assumptions.
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Appendix A. Proofs
A.1. Proof of Theorem 1
We ﬁrst deﬁne a special class of trees we call special 2-level stars (S2L–STAR). See Fig. A.16 for an example.
Deﬁnition 11 (S2L–STAR). Special 2-level star graph instances (S2L–STAR) are:
• V = {v0, v1, v2, . . . , v2n}, where v0 is the starting position;
• T = V \ {v0}, where vertices vi with i ∈ {1, . . . , n} are called inner targets, while vertices vi with i ∈ {n + 1, . . . , 2n} are 
called outer targets;
• E = {(v0, vi), (vi, vn+i) : ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}} and we refer to the pair of edges ((v0, vi), (vi, vn+i)) as the i-th branch;
• travel costs are c(v0, vi) = c(vi, vn+i) = γi for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, where γi ∈N+;
• penetration times are, for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, d(t) =
{
6H − 3γi t = vi




• π(t) = 1 for every t ∈ T .
Initially, we show a property of S2L–STAR instances that we shall use below.
Lemma 12. If an instance of S2L–STAR admits a maximal covering route r that covers all the targets, then the branches can be parti-
tioned in two sets C1 and C2 such that:






Proof. Initially, we observe that, in a feasible solution, the visit of a branch can be of two forms. If branch i is visited once, 
then D will visit the inner target before time 6H − 3γi and immediately after the outer target. C1 denotes the set of all the 
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6H −3γi , coming back to v0 immediately after, and subsequently in some time after 6H −3γi , but before 10H −2γi , D will 
visit again the inner target and immediately after the outer target. C2 denotes the set of all the branches that are visited 
according to this form. All the other forms of visits (e.g., three or more visits, different order visits, and visits at different 
times) are useless and any route in which some branch is not neither in C1 nor in C2 can be modiﬁed such that all the 
branches are either in C1 or in C2 strictly decreasing the cost of the solution as follows:
• if branch i is visited only once and the visit of the inner target is after time 6H − 3γi , then the solution is not feasible;
• if branch i is visited twice and the ﬁrst visit of the inner target is after time 6H − 3γi , then the solution is not feasible;
• if branch i is visited twice and the second visit of the inner target is before time 6H − 3γi , then the ﬁrst visit of the 
branch can be omitted saving 2γi ;
• if branch i is visited twice and the outer target is visited during the ﬁrst visit, then the second visit of the branch can 
be omitted saving ≥ 2γi ;
• if branch i is visited three or more times, all the visits except the ﬁrst one in which the inner target is visited and the 
ﬁrst one in which the outer target is visited can be omitted saving ≥ 2γi .
We assume that, if there is a maximal covering route r that covers all the targets, then the visits are such that C1 ∪ C2 =
{1, . . . , n} and therefore that each branch is visited either once or twice as discussed above. We show below that in S2L–STAR 















γi ≤ 10H (A.2)
Constraint (A.1) requires that the cost of visiting entirely all the branches in C1 and partially (only the inner target) all the 
branches in C2 is not larger than the penetration times of the inner targets. Notice that this holds only when the last inner 
target is ﬁrst-visited on a branch in C1. We show below that such assumption is always veriﬁed. Constraint (A.2) requires 
that the cost of visiting entirely all the branches in C1 and at ﬁrst partially and subsequently entirely all the branches in C2










































γi = H .
Therefore, if r covers all the targets and it is such that all the branches belong either to C1 or to C2, we have that r visits 
the last outer target exactly at its penetration time. This is because Constraints (A.1) and (A.2) hold as equalities. Thus, as 
shown above, in any route in which a branch is neither in C1 nor in C2, we can change the visits such that all the branches 
are in either C1 or C2, strictly reducing the total cost. It follows that no route with at least one branch that is not neither 
in C1 nor in C2 can have a total cost equal to or smaller than the penetration time of the outer targets. Similarly, from the 
above equality it follows that any solution where the last inner target is ﬁrst-visited on a C2 branch can be strictly improved 
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a total cost equal to or smaller than the penetration time of the outer targets. 
We can now prove Theorem 1.
Proof. We provide a reduction from PARTITION that is known to be weakly NP-hard.
Deﬁnition 12 (PARTITION). The decision problem PARTITION is deﬁned as:
INSTANCE: A ﬁnite set I = {1, 2, . . . , l}, a size ai ∈N+ for each i ∈ I , and a bound B ∈N+ such that ∑i∈I ai = 2B .
QUESTION: Is there any subset I ′ ⊆ I such that ∑i∈I ′ ai =∑i∈I\I ′ ai = B?
For the sake of clarity, we divide the proof in steps.
Reduction. We map an instance of PARTITION to an instance of k–SRG-v on S2L–STAR graphs as follows
• S = {s},
• n = l (i.e., the number of branches in S2L–STAR equals the number of elements in PARTITION);
• γi = ai for every i ∈ I;
• H = B ,
• k = 0.
The rationale is that there is a feasible solution for PARTITION if and only if there is the maximal covering route that covers 
all the targets in a k–SRG-v on a S2L–STAR graph.
If. From Lemma 12 we know that, if there is the maximal covering route that covers all the targets in a k–SRG-v on a 




i∈C2 γi = H . By construction 
γi = ai and H = B . So, if there is the maximal covering route that covers all the targets in a k–SRG-v on a S2L–STAR graph, 
then there is partition of set I in two subsets I ′ = C1 and I ′′ = C2 such that ∑i∈C1 γi =∑i∈I ′ ai = H = B =∑i∈C2 γi =∑
i∈I ′′ ai .
Only if. If PARTITION admits a feasible solution, then, once assigned I ′ = C1 and I ′′ = C2, it is straightforward to see that 
the route visits all the targets by their penetration times and therefore that the route is a maximal covering route. 
As a ﬁnal remark, let us notice that this result does not exclude the existence of an FPTAS, i.e., Fully Polynomial Time 
Approximation Scheme (in fact, PARTITION admits an FPTAS).
A.2. Proof of Theorem 2
The theorem immediately follows from the same proof given for Theorem 1 and reported in the previous section.
A.3. Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. Assume that, for simplicity, S = {s1} and that T (s1) = T . Initially, we observe that MAX–COV-SET is in co-NP. Indeed, 
any covering route r such that T (r) ⊃ T ′ is a NO certiﬁcate for MAX–COV-SET, placing it in co-NP. (Notice that, trivially, any 
covering route has length bounded by O (|T |2); also, notice that due to Theorem 2, having a covering set would not suﬃce 
given that we cannot verify in polynomial time whether it is actually covering unless P = NP.)
Let us suppose we have a polynomial-time algorithm for MAX–COV-SET, called A. Then (since P ⊆ NP ∩ co-NP) we have 
a polynomial algorithm for the complement problem, i.e., deciding whether all the covering routes for T ′ are dominated. 
Let us consider the following algorithm. Given an instance for COV-SET speciﬁed by graph G = (V , E), a set of target T with 
penetration times d, and a starting vertex v:
1. assign to targets in T a lexicographic order t1, t2, . . . , t|T |;
2. for every t ∈ T , verify if {t} is a covering set in O (|T |) time by comparing ω∗v,t and d(t); if at least one is not a covering 
set, then output NO and terminate; otherwise set Tˆ = {t1} and k = 2;
3. apply algorithm A on the following instance: graph G = (V , E), target set {Tˆ ∪{tk}, ˆd} (where dˆ is d restricted to Tˆ ∪{tk}), 
start vertex v , and covering set Tˆ ;
4. if A’s output is YES (that is, Tˆ is not maximal) then set Tˆ = Tˆ ∪ {tk}, k = k + 1 and restart from step 3; if A’s output is 
NO and k = |T | then output YES, if A’s output is NO and k < |T | then output NO.
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contradict Theorem 2. 
A.4. Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. We produce an approximation-preserving reduction from TSP(1, 2) that is known to be APX-hard [51]. For the sake 
of clarity, we divide the proof in steps.
TSP(1, 2) instance. An instance of undirected TSP(1, 2) is deﬁned as follows:
• a set of vertices VT S P ;
• a set of edges composed of an edge per pair of vertices;
• a symmetric matrix CT S P of weights, whose values can be 1 or 2, each associated with an edge and representing the 
cost of the shortest path between the corresponding pair of vertices.
The goal is to ﬁnd the minimum cost tour. Let us denote by O P T SO LT S P and O P TT S P the optimal solution of TSP(1, 2) 
and its cost, respectively. Furthermore, let us denote by AP X SO LT S P and AP XT S P an approximate solution of TSP(1, 2) and 
its cost, respectively. It is known that there is no polynomial-time approximation algorithm with AP XT S P /O P T AP X < α for 
some α > 1, unless P = NP [51].
Reduction. We map an instance of TSP(1, 2) to a speciﬁc instance of SRG-v as follows:
• there is only one signal s;
• T (s) = VT S P ;
• w∗t,t′ = CT S P (t, t′), for every t, t′ ∈ T (s);• π(t) = 1, for every t ∈ T (s);
• w∗v,t = 1, for every t ∈ T (s);
• d(t) =
{
O P TT S P if O P TT S P = |VT S P |
O P TT S P − 1 if O P TT S P > |VT S P | , for every t ∈ T (s).
In this reduction, we use the value of O P TT S P even if there is no polynomial-time algorithm solving exactly TSP(1, 2), 
unless P = NP. We show below that with an additional polynomial-time effort we can deal with the lack of knowledge of 
O P TT S P .
OPT–SRG-v optimal solution. By construction of the SRG-v instance, there is a covering route starting from v and visiting 
all the targets t ∈ T (s), each within its penetration time. This route has a cost of exactly d(t) and it is 〈v, t1, . . . , t|T (s)|〉, 
where 〈t1, . . . , t|T (s)|, t1〉 corresponds to O P T SO LT S P with the constraint that w∗t|T (s)|,t1 = 2 if O P TT S P > |VT S P | (essentially, 
we transform the tour in a path by discarding one of the edges with the largest cost). Therefore, the optimal solution of 
SRG-v , say O P T SO LSRG , prescribes to play the maximal route with probability one and the optimal value, say O P T SRG , 
is 1.
OPT–SRG-v approximation. Let us denote by AP X SO LSRG and AP XSRG an approximate solution of OPT–SRG-v and its 
value, respectively. We assume there is a polynomial-time approximation algorithm with AP XSRG/O P T SRG ≥ β where 
β ∈ (0, 1). Let us notice that AP X SO LSRG prescribes to play a polynomially upper bounded number of covering routes 
with strictly positive probability. We introduce a lemma that characterizes such covering routes.
Lemma 13. The longest covering route played with strictly positive probability in AP X SO LSRG visits at least β|T (s)| targets.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that the longest route visits β|T (s)| − 1 targets. The best case in terms of maximization 
of the value of OPT–SRG-v is, due to reasons of symmetry (all the targets have the same value), when there is a set of 
|T (s)| covering routes of length β|T (s)| − 1 such that each target is visited exactly by β|T (s)| − 1 routes. When these 
routes are available, the best strategy is to randomize uniformly over the routes. The probability that a target is covered is 
β − 1|T (s)| and therefore the value of AP XSRG is β − 1|T (s)| . This leads to a contradiction, since the algorithm would provide 
an approximation strictly smaller than β . 
TSP(1, 2) approximation from OPT–SRG-v approximation. We use the above lemma to show that we can build a (3 −
2β)-approximation for TSP(1, 2) from a β-approximation of OPT–SRG-v . Given an AP X SO LSRG , we extract the longest cov-
ering route played with strictly positive probability, say 〈v, t1, . . . , tβ|T (s)|〉. The route has a cost of at most d(t), it would not 
cover β|T (s)| targets otherwise. Any tour 〈t1, . . . , tβ|T (s)|, tβ|T (s)|+1, . . . , t|T (s)|, t1〉 has a cost not larger than d(t) − 1 + 2(1 −
β)|T (s)| = O P TT S P −1 +2(1 −β)|VT S P | (under the worst case in which all the edges in 〈tβ|T (s)|, tβ|T (s)|+1, . . . , t|T (s)|, t1〉 have 
a cost of 2). Given that O P TT S P ≥ |VT S P |, we have that such a tour has a cost not larger than O P TT S P −1 +2(1 −β)|VT S P | ≤
O P TT S P (3 − 2β). Therefore, the tour is a (3 − 2β)-approximation for TSP(1, 2). Since TSP(1, 2) is not approximable in poly-
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covering route r1 with r1(0) = v1 and T (r1) = T . It can be observed that there is another Hamiltonian path for GH , i.e., 〈h9, h8, h5, h4, h1, h2, h3, h6, h7, h10〉, 
allowing covering route r2 with r2(0) = v2 and T (r2) = T . Notice that, if we remove the edge (h5, h8), then covering route r2 such that r2(0) = v2 and 
T (r2) = T does not exist.
nomial time for any approximation ratio smaller than α, we have the constraint that 3 −2β ≥ α, and therefore that β ≤ 3−α2 . 
Since α > 1, we have that 3−α2 < 1 and therefore that there is no polynomial-time approximation algorithm for OPT–SRG-v
when β ∈ ( 3−α2 , 1), unless P = NP.
O P TT S P oracle. In order to deal with the fact that we do not know O P TT S P , we can execute the approximation algorithm 
for OPT–SRG-v using a guess over O P TT S P . More precisely, we execute the approximation algorithm for every value in 
{|VT S P |, . . . , 2|VT S P |} and we return the best approximation found for TSP(1, 2). Given that O P TT S P ∈ {|VT S P |, . . . , 2|VT S P |}, 
there is an execution of the approximation algorithm that uses the correct guess. 
A.5. Proof of Theorem 11
Proof. We divide the proof in two steps, membership and hardness.
Membership. Given a YES certiﬁcate constitutes by a route, the veriﬁcation is easy, requiring one to apply the route and 
check whether each target is visited by its deadline. It requires linear time in the number of targets.
Hardness. Let us consider the Restricted Hamiltonian Circuit problem (RHC) which is known to be NP-complete. RHC is 
deﬁned as follows: given a graph GH = (VH , EH ) and an Hamiltonian path P = 〈h1, . . . , hn〉 for GH such that hi ∈ VH and 
(h1, hn) /∈ EH , ﬁnd an Hamiltonian cycle for GH . From such instance of RHC, following the approach of [38], we build the 
following instance for lm–COV–ROUTE:
• V = VH ∪ {v1, v2, vt};
• T = VH ∪ {vt}; 
• E = EH ∪ {(hn, vt), (hi, vs) : i ∈ {1, . . . , n}}; 
• d(vt) = n + 1 and d(t) = n for any t ∈ T with t = vt ; 
• wv,v ′ =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 if v = hn, v ′ = vt
1 if v = hi, v ′ = h j,∀i, j ∈ {1, . . .n}
1 if v = v1, v ′ = h1
2 if v = v1, v ′ = hn−1
≥ 2 if v = v1, v ′ = hi,∀i ∈ {1, . . .n− 2,n}
≥ 2 if v = v1, v ′ = vt
2 if v = v2, v ′ = h1
1 if v = v2, v ′ = hn−1
≥ 2 if v = v2, v ′ = hi,∀i ∈ {1, . . .n− 2,n}
≥ 2 if v = v2, v ′ = vt
; 
• r1 = 〈v1, h1, · · · , hn, vt〉.
Basically, given GH , we introduce three vertices v1, v2, vt , where v1, v2 are adjacent starting vertices and vt is a target. 
We know the covering routes from v1, and we aim at ﬁnding the covering routes from v2. The new starting vertex (v2) is 
closer to hn−1 than the previous one (v1) by 1 and farther from h1 than previous one (v1) by 1. There is no constraint over 
the distances between the starting vertices and the other targets except that they are larger than or equal to 2. We report in 
Fig. A.17 an example of the above construction. Notice that, by construction, if the maximal covering route r2 with r2(0) = v2
and T (r2) = T exists, then vt must be the last visited target. Route r1 is covering since 〈h1, . . . , hn〉 is a Hamiltonian path 
for GH . We need to show that route r2 with r2(0) = v2 and T (r2) = T exists if and only if GH admits a Hamiltonian cycle. 
It can observed that, if r2 exists, then it must be such that r2 = 〈v2, hn−1, . . . , hn, vt〉 and therefore 〈hn−1, . . . , hn〉 must be 
N. Basilico et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 246 (2017) 220–257 253a Hamiltonian path for GH . Since we know, by r1, that (hn−1, hn) ∈ EH , it follows that 〈hn−1, . . . , hn, hn−1〉 is a Hamiltonian 
cycle. 
Appendix B. Additional results for special topologies
In this section we show that for some special classes of graphs we can give a polynomial-time algorithm for answering 
Question 2.
B.1. Line and cycle graphs
Let us ﬁrst concentrate on line graphs for which an example is depicted in Fig. B.18(a). Consider a modiﬁed version 
of Algorithm 1 where, when deciding on admissible expansions, we add to Conditions 1–3 the following one: the cost of 
the newly formed covering set must be smaller than or equal to the penetration time of any target not included in such 
set. Given Q kv,t , the expansion Q
k+1
v,w is admissible only if for any t ∈ T (s) \ Q kv,w the inequality d(t) ≥ c(Q k+1v,w ) holds. Such 
modiﬁed algorithm runs in polynomial time on line graph instances. To see this, notice that any covering set enumerated 
has only two possible expansions and can be compactly represented by two vertices: a left one and a right one. All the 
targets between the two extremes are covered by the covering set. This makes the number of expansions performed by the 
algorithm O (|T (s)|2).
The soundness of the algorithm can simply be determined by noticing that the new condition we imposed on admissible 
expansions prevents Algorithm 1 from generating only those that would never led to the covering set including all the 
targets. This implies that we can answer Question 2 in polynomial time for this class of instances. Notice that this results 
can be easily extended to cycle graphs, see Fig. B.18(b) and to tree graphs where the number of leaves is ﬁxed.
Assessing the computational complexity of ﬁnding the maxmin equilibrium in line graphs is a problem left open in 
this paper. While when searching for a route covering all targets we can safely consider only covering sets deﬁned by 
two extremes, this is not longer true when searching for an equilibrium. The main reason is that we cannot safely discard 
routes traversing targets whose penetration time is expired and this does not allow one to provide a polynomially bounded 
representation of the covering sets. We conjecture that the problem is FNP-hard. To support our conjecture, we provide a 
class of instances whose non-dominated covering sets rises exponentially in |T | for the values of |T | such that the problem 
can be solved in reasonable time. More precisely, we empirically observed that the number of non-dominated covering sets 
of these instances is (2
|T |−1
2 ) for |T | ≤ 23. With |T | ≥ 25, Algorithm 1 requires too long time to solve the problem and 
therefore we could not evaluate the number of non-dominated covering sets (a formal proof that the number of covering 
sets is exponential does not seem straightforward). While this is not a hardness proof, we believe that it could be an 
evidence and we report such instances because they could be useful for any researcher interested in the study of line 
graphs. The instances are deﬁned as follow: given the starting vertex v , there are (|T | − 1)/2 targets at the left of v and 
(|T | − 1)/2 targets at the right of v . The cost of each edge is 1. The value of d(t) is the square of the cost of the shortest 
path between t and v . In these instances, there are non-dominated routes continuously oscillating from the left to the right 
of the starting vertex v and vice versa.
Let us now consider a star graph, as shown in Fig. B.19, deﬁned as follows.
Fig. B.18. Special graphs: line and cycle.
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Deﬁnition 13 (SIMPLE–STAR). Simple star graph instances (SIMPLE–STAR) are:
• V = {v0, v1, v2, . . . , vn}, where v0 is the starting vertex of D;
• T = V \ {v0};
• E = {(v0, vi), ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}};
• travel costs are c(v0, vi) = γi , where γi ∈N+;
• penetration times d(t) and values π(t) can be any.
We can state the following theorem, whose proof is not direct as in the case of line and cycle graphs and thus more 
details are necessary.
Theorem 14. If the maximal covering route r covering all the targets exists, the Earliest Due Date algorithm returns r in polynomial 
time once applied to SIMPLE–STAR graph instances.
Proof. The Earliest Due Date [52] (EDD) algorithm is an optimal algorithm for synchronous (i.e., without release times) ape-
riodic scheduling with deadlines. It executes (without preemption) the tasks in ascending order according to the deadlines, 
thus requiring polynomial complexity in the number of tasks. Any SIMPLE–STAR graph instance can be easily mapped to 
a synchronous aperiodic scheduling problem: each target ti is an aperiodic task J i , the computation time of J i is equal to 
2γi , the deadline of task J i is d(ti) + γi . It is straightforward to see that, if EDD returns a feasible schedule, then there is 
the maximal covering route, and, if EDD returns a non-feasible schedule, then there is not any maximal covering route. 
The above result shows that Question 2 can be answered in polynomial time.
We focus on Question 3, showing that also this question can be answered in polynomial time for the above special 
instances.
Theorem 15. Given a signal s, the best pure strategy of D in an SRG-v game on line graph, cycle graph, and SIMPLE–STAR graph 
instances can be found in polynomial time.
Proof. For the sake of clarity, we describe the algorithm in the simpliﬁed case in which there is only one signal s. The 
extension to the general case is straightforward. The algorithm works as follows:
1. apply the algorithm searching for the route covering all the targets,
2. if the maximal covering route exists, then return it,
3. else remove the target t with the smallest π(t) from T (s),
4. go to Point 1.
Essentially, the algorithm returns the subset of targets admitting a covering route minimizing the maximum value among 
all the non-covered targets. 
Notice that the above results can be easily extended to tree graphs where the number of leaves is ﬁxed.
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We report in Fig. C.20 the boxplots of the results depicted in Fig. 5. They show that the variance of the compute times 
drastically reduces as  increases. This is because the number of edges increases as  increases and so the number of 
covering sets increases approaching 2|T | . On the other hand, with small values of  , the number of covering sets of different 
instances can be extremely different.
Fig. C.20. Boxplots of compute times required by our exact dynamic programming algorithm.
Appendix D. Notation
We report in Table D.3 the symbols used along the paper.
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Symbols table.
Symbol Meaning
Basic model A Attacker
D Defender
G Graph
V Set of vertices
v Vertex
vi i-th vertex
E Set of edges
(v, v ′) Edge
ω∗v,v ′ Temporal cost (in turns) of the shortest path between v and v
′
T Set of targets
t Target
ti i-th target
π(t) Value of target t
d(t) Penetration time of target t
Signals S Set of signals
s Signal
p Function specifying the probability of having the system generating
signal s given that target t has been attacked
T (s) Targets having a positive probability of raising s if attacked
S(t) Signals having a positive probability of being raised if t is attacked
⊥ No signals have been generated
 No targets are under attack
Routes Rv,s Set of routes starting from vertex v when signal s is generated
r Route
ri i-th route
r(i) i-th element visited along route r
UA(ri , ti) Attacker’s utility given a route r and a target t
σD Defender’s strategy
σDv Defender’s strategy starting from vertex v
σDv,s Defender’s strategy starting from vertex v when signal s is generated
σA Attacker’s strategy
σAv Attacker’s strategy when D is in v
gv Value of the game (utility of A)
A(r(i)) Time needed by D to visit r(i) starting from r(0)
T (r) Set of targets covered by route r
c(r) Temporal cost (in turns) associated to r
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